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ZIONISM AND THE
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MORRIS JASTROW, JR., PH.D., LL.D.

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ZIONISM AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism

BY
MORRIS JASTROW, JR., PH.D., LL.D.

Professor in the University of Pennsylvania

*"The past is for inspiration, not imitation,
for continuation, not repetition."*

(ZANGWILL)

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TO
FELIX ADLER
A MODERN APOSTLE OF FREEDOM
AND LIGHT



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PREFACE

Up to the present the Zionists have done most of the writing and all of the shouting. They have succeeded in moving the political aspects of Zionism so far into the foreground as to overshadow the older religious Zionism which forms an integral doctrine of orthodox Judaism, and entirely to obscure the original aspect of the modern movement which started out as a purely ameliorative measure to secure, through colonization in Palestine, "self-emancipation"¹ for Jews living under distressing conditions in Russia. Political Zionism holds the center of the stage. The Zionists have also succeeded in creating the impression on the outside world that Political Zionism represents a national uprising among the Jews in general, a recrudescence of national feelings that have long lain dormant. The claim is made that Zionism is part of the movement for the reassertion of nationalities that forms such a striking feature of the political history of Europe in the nineteenth century, and

¹ See for this term, p. 5.

that is now showing itself again at the end of the war in the rise of the suppressed nationalities of Poland, Bohemia, Armenia and Arabia. This impression is entirely erroneous and misleading. As a matter of fact, of the Jews settled in Western European countries and in this country where Jews enjoy precisely the same political and other rights as their fellow-citizens, only a very small percentage of those who have lived long enough in these countries to have become assimilated to the political and social conditions, approve of political Zionism. The larger proportion of such Jews are probably entirely indifferent to the question.

Not content with this, political Zionists now claim that the issue has been won, that opposition to it has become useless, that those who continue to combat it are blind to the rapid movement of events through which, as one of the leaders puts it, "Zionism has been transferred from the field of national aspirations to the realm of political fact." The slogan has been given out to drown all opposition by a mighty chorus of "victory" shouts. And all this before the Peace Conference at Paris has made any declaration on the subject!

The basis of this assurance appears to be largely the statement made by the Right Honorable Arthur

J. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under date of November 2nd, 1917, that the British government "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object." The statement means much or little according as one gauges what Mr. Balfour had in mind in making it. It will be noted that Mr. Balfour avoids the term "Jewish State," and speaks only of a "national homeland." To a "homeland" for such Jews as have gone to Palestine or who propose to settle there, there is, of course, no objection; and I emphasize throughout this volume the desirability of encouraging the colonization movement in every possible way as much for the sake of Palestine as for that of the Jews, since the country can only benefit by the presence of a thrifty and industrious population devoted to the improvement of the land and to promoting its industrial and commercial activity. It all depends, therefore, on what is meant by "national." Mr. Balfour, it may be admitted, would not have used the term had he not accepted the main contention of political Zionists that the Jews were a separate nation or nationality. Now Mr. Balfour, so far as known, has made no special

study of either Jewish history or of the Jewish religion or of the psychology of the Jewish people. His type of mind is, as is well known, essentially skeptical, and he would be apt to view such a question as Zionism from the point of view of diplomatic policy. At all events he would probably be the last one to claim any weight attaching to his opinion of the crucial question, whether the Jews are a nation or merely a religious body that once *was* a nation. The ultimate source, therefore, of the introduction of the term "national" into Mr. Balfour's declaration is the platform of the political Zionists. If, therefore, it can be shown, as I propose to do in this volume, that this term cannot properly be applied to the Jews, the declaration would merely have the force attaching to any statement coming from so distinguished a personage as Mr. Balfour. Granting the full weight of the statement as it stands, it does not follow that Mr. Balfour favors the organization of the Jews, viewed as a national unit, into a *political* unit in Palestine to be placed in control of that country. He is silent on this essential point — naturally so, for Mr. Balfour is, above all, a statesman, and when he wrote this declaration, the issue of the war was still uncertain, and even he was not in a position to decide

what should become of Palestine upon the termination of the great conflict. He could not at the time have envisaged more than the recognition of the Jews to the right of self-government in their colonies. We are now in a position, however, to appeal from Mr. Balfour of 1917 to Mr. Balfour of 1918, at a time when the war was approaching its close. Judging from his later utterance,¹ it would seem that Mr. Balfour has been impressed by the opposition which, since his first declaration, Zionism had encountered in many circles. The emphasis is placed by him on Palestine as a home for "homeless" Jews. The "national homeland" is not stressed, and it would appear that Mr. Balfour now views Zionism largely, if not purely, as an ameliorative measure for a portion of the Jewish people. He expresses his belief that those Jews who are led to go to Palestine will be happier in a "civil community which completely harmonizes with their historical and religious sentiments: a community bound to the land it inhabits by something deeper even than custom." To this every one interested in the welfare of such Jews as wish to settle in Palestine can cheerfully assent, but this is *not* political Zionism.

¹ In the Introduction (dated September 20th, 1918) to N. Sokolow's *History of Zionism* (London, 1919), pp. xxix-xxxiv.

Apparently, the political Zionists themselves have come to a realization of the vagueness of the former declaration, for a demand is being made for a more precise statement as to the intentions of the British Government towards Palestine.¹

The fact is that a declaration such as Mr. Balfour made before the termination of the conflict should only have been taken at the time as an indication of general sympathy with the ameliorative aspects of the Zionist movement, and not as an endorsement of the political aims of the Zionists to reorganize Palestine as a distinctively Jewish State. Similarly, the endorsement of Mr. Balfour's sentiments by the French and Italian governments, couched in very general terms, and the statement issued last September by President Wilson ought not to be regarded as more than a general expression of sympathy with the humanitarian phases of the Zionist movement.

Events that have transpired since the termination of the war justify the suspicion — and indeed more than suspicion, — that the statesmen who are to grapple with the problem of the reorganization of Palestine will feel their way cautiously. Even before the termination of the war protests from Chris-

¹ See the *London Jewish Chronicle* for February 7th, 1919.

tians and Mohammedans were raised against the political program of Zionism. Still more significant is the attitude of representative men among English, French and American Jews. In England a "League of British Jews" was formed led by such men as Claude G. Montefiore and Israel Abrahams, whose authoritative position as students of Jewish history and Jewish religion lends great weight to their utterances. In this country, a statement signed by over three hundred representative American Jews from all parts of the country, protesting against the program of the political Zionists has been forwarded to the Peace Conference.¹ The opposition also shows itself in England and in this country in warnings raised by such men as Sir George Adam Smith, Herbert Adams Gibbons, the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Ex-Ambassador of the United States to Turkey, and others, who speak from a direct knowledge of the East and of Eastern conditions.²

In the spring of 1918 the French government sent a commission of experts to Palestine for the purpose of investigating the economic conditions and the attitude of the natives towards political

¹ Republished as an appendix to this volume, pp. 151-159.

² See note on p. 117.

Zionism. Among the members of the commission was M. Sylvain Lévi, the distinguished Orientalist, who in the same year was sent by the French government to this country in order to ascertain the views of Zionists, and Non-Zionists as well, towards the proposed reorganization of the Jewish State. The result of M. Lévi's investigations in Palestine and in this country is to be seen in the statement that he made before the Peace Conference on March 1st which was decidedly unfavorable to political Zionism. Strong pressure was brought to bear upon Professor Lévi to refrain from exposing the weaknesses of political Zionism, but he felt it his duty, on the basis of his investigations, to do so, with the result of bringing down on him the wrath of the English Zionists, who apparently believe in the foolish policy of forcible suppression of opposition to their movement. A delegation of English Zionists was heard by the Peace Conference just preceding M. Sylvain Lévi, and Dr. Weizmann in his account to the Zionist Conference of the result of the hearing was frank enough to state that he declined to shake hands with M. Lévi, and accused him of "betraying" the cause.¹ This exhi-

¹ See the report of the Conference in the *Jewish Exponent*, Philadelphia, for March 28, 1919.

hibition of bad manners as well as of bad temper does not indicate that the Zionists are as confident of their ultimate success as their public utterances would suggest. A further indication that the issue has not yet been won is the manner in which the political Zionists have shifted their position of late. They now place the organization of the Jewish State in the distant future, possibly in order to prepare their followers for the disappointment that will ensue in case the Peace Conference should decide not to propose steps for the organization of such a State. Some of them have even gone so far as to suggest the abandonment of the designation "Jewish State" and now speak of a "Commonwealth of Palestine." They thereby either give the whole case away, or raise the suspicion of proposing a verbal camouflage to conceal the real aim that they have in mind. It is probably a safe guess that the leaders have been given an intimation that the Peace Conference will not go beyond the expression of general sympathy with Jewish colonization in Palestine and the promise to secure full rights to Jews settled there, with perhaps local autonomy for the colonies.

But irrespective of what the Peace Conference may or may not do, it must be clear to all who view

the situation calmly that the Palestinian problem, as the other questions connected with the Near East, will occupy the thought of the world for some time to come. Meanwhile, it is of importance to understand the nature of these problems. Zionism is one of them (though only one) and the wide interest that it has aroused, which is not limited to those directly concerned, is sufficient justification for making the attempt, as I do in this volume, to consider the various aspects and the roots of the movement, its relation to the general Eastern Question and to conditions in Palestine, and also what appear to me to be the fallacies of political Zionism from the point of view of a student of history. I am further led to make this endeavor by requests that have reached me from various sides to give a full presentation of the reasons why many who have made a study of the subject cannot accept the program of the political Zionists.

In stressing the historical point of view, as I do throughout the volume, I trust that even those who may not be disposed to agree with me will recognize that I do not look upon the historical treatment of a subject as a cold-blooded anatomical dissection. The historian must aim to clothe the skeleton of his facts with flesh and sinews, aye, even to supply it

with "teeth." In tracing Zionism to its roots, as in following the trend of Jewish history including a survey of the Reform movement in Judaism, and in setting forth the present-day conditions in Palestine, it has been my aim not only to be fair, but also to reveal my sympathies for those larger aspects of Jewish history which account for the peculiar interest attaching to an analysis of the status of the Jews, and more particularly to their strange survival, despite all vicissitudes. For the Jews furnish a single and singular illustration of a people commingling with all the nations of the world without losing their identity — like the Gulf Stream that can be distinguished from the great body of the surrounding ocean through which it flows.

I cannot refrain from touching here upon a weakness of the Zionistic movement which I have directly encountered in the preparation of this volume, and which consists in the vagueness of the definitions of terms such as "Jewish Nation," "Jewish culture," "Jewish spirit," used by Zionists in describing the movement. This is in part due to the fact that many of those who make public addresses and write on Zionism, including some of the leaders of the movement in this country, have not made any special study of the history of the Jews or of their

literature. Without such study one is apt to fall into all kinds of strange vagaries. The tension of the situation is somewhat relieved upon finding distinguished jurists extolling the glories of Judaism, of which they know little either in theory or practice, and expounding the beauties of the Hebrew language of which they cannot read the characters. The task of the student of the subject would be much simplified if Zionists could agree upon some clear and definite statement of the fundamentals that might be labelled as "genuine," with the additional warning, "beware of imitations," As it is, every Zionist feels at liberty to manufacture his own brand of Zionism. This is particularly the case when it comes to a definition of a "Jewish State." In the hope of overcoming opposition to their political program some Zionists are so vague in their use of the term "nation" and in their view of the "Jewish State," that they practically define both terms out of existence. I have tried to make allowances for what appear to be merely subtle arguments in the presentation of the subject and have taken as my point of departure that a "Jewish State" means what the term used implies to the person of average intellect; and I have tried, following in

the wake of Lord Bryce, to distinguish between a "nation" and a "nationality."¹

Lastly, I would call attention to the fact that it is only for the sake of convenience that I have treated the subject in a series of eight sections. The volume should be read as a whole, and I trust that those who do read it will reserve their judgment until they have followed the presentation of the subject to the end.

A word of grateful acknowledgment is due, as in the case of all my books, to my wife, my severest and my most sympathetic critic, who has, as usual, read through the manuscript and aided in revising the proofs, with the result of making valuable suggestions and of detecting slips and errors.

It is a pleasure and privilege to be permitted to write on the dedication page the name of a valued friend whose career, devoted to the service of humanity, has exerted a deep influence on my own thought and whose companionship has been a source of real inspiration these many years.

Philadelphia, May, 1919.

¹ See p. 68 *et seq.*

ZIONISM AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

I

THE THREE ASPECTS OF ZIONISM

THROUGH recent events Zionism has been moved into the foreground of publicity. The movement, which seeks as its ultimate aim the reorganization of Palestine as a Jewish State, is of interest not only to Jews, and that irrespective of their attitude towards religion,—but also to non-Jews. For Zionism involves the future of Palestine; and Palestine is a country equally sacred to the followers of three great religions,—to Christians and Mohammedans, as well as to Jews — who together constitute about one-half of the entire population of the world.¹

There are three main aspects of Zionism which need to be sharply differentiated from each other,

¹ There are, on a rough estimate, about 240 million Mohammedans, about 565 million Christians and about 15 million Jews, a total of 820 millions or about 50 per cent. of the world's population.

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though in the movement itself they tend to coalesce — Religious, Economic, and Political Zionism. Religious Zionism is an integral part of the orthodox Jewish faith. The hope of a return of the Jews to Palestine rests for the orthodox believer upon his belief in the fulfillment of divine prophecies, which assert that Jehovah will gather His chosen people from the ends of the earth, restore the Temple service as of old (including such a crude survival of primitive worship as animal sacrifices) and re-establish both the ancient Jewish priesthood and the Jewish Kingdom. This belief in the restoration of the Jews is closely bound up with another doctrine, that Jehovah will at the proper time, send a Messiah to redeem His people and to bring all mankind to recognize the sway of the one God, who chose Israel to preach His doctrine to the world.¹ Furthermore, these two doctrines, the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, and the belief in a Messiah, are corollaries following from a third doctrine, that the Jews are the chosen people of God. Orthodox Judaism may thus be said to rest upon four pillars — the belief in one God, the belief that the Jews are His people, belief in the Messiah as

¹ See M. Friedlaender, *The Jewish Religion* (London, 1901), pp. 156-163.

God's messenger to be sent to redeem His people and all mankind, and belief in the return of the Jews to their native land. It will be apparent that the Zionism of orthodox Jews assumes an indissoluble bond between religion and nationality. According to this faith the Jews are bound by a double bond, but the national bond, although tacitly assumed, has a merely theoretical or academic force until the time for the restoration arrives. Orthodox Zionism, furthermore, stands on the platform that the fulfillment of divine prophecy is not to be brought about through ordinary human agencies,—not even through a Peace Conference,—but by God Himself in His own time and in His own way. Religious Zionism is, therefore, a doctrine hardly capable of being translated into an active political movement. As a matter of fact, only a small proportion of genuinely orthodox Jews are actively engaged in the modern Zionistic movement,¹ though the orthodox longing for the return to Zion is, as we shall see, one of the chief roots of the modern movement itself.

We may designate as economic Zionism the ef-

¹ The orthodox group represented in the movement is known as Mizrachi, signifying "Eastern." See Richard Gottheil, *Zionism*, pages 97 and 177. The group was founded in Vilno in 1903.

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fort which has to a large degree inspired the entire Zionistic movement, to ameliorate the pitiable condition of Jews living in such countries as Russia and Roumania, without rights of citizenship and subject to all manner of oppression, alternating with persecution and officially sanctioned pogroms. Huddled together within the restricted area known as the "Pale" and there living without civic rights, they were at all times at the mercy of a sinister and despotic government which, when it suited its purpose, inflamed the people to brutal attacks on the lives and property of defenseless men, women and children. The world has been horrified and scandalized at various times during the past three decades by reports of persecution, murder and pillage in the Jewish Pale. The hopelessness of the outlook for internal improvement of the position of the Jews in these countries, to which we may add Poland where the situation was likewise disheartening, naturally suggested as the only remedial measure a plan of securing a home elsewhere. Even though it was realized that wholesale emigration was not possible, yet some measure of relief would be afforded by having an outlet for at least a portion of the congested Jewish population in Russian Poland and Roumania, forming together one-half of the entire num-

ber of Jews in the world.¹ This congestion, more particularly in Russia where the Jews were huddled together within the Pale of settlement, strictly defined by the Government, emphasized at once the seriousness and the hopelessness of the problem unless unforeseen changes should take place. It was therefore natural, and certainly not accidental, that the modern Zionistic movement took its rise in Russia, and at first purely as an ameliorative program. When in 1881 it became evident, through the promulgation of the cruel "May Laws," imposing still further restrictions on the Jewish Pale, that the Russian Government instead of alleviating the situation was determined to crush all hopes of any improvement, a physician, Dr. Leo Pinsker, living in Odessa, voiced his project of what he called "Self-Emancipation" for the Jews.² By this he meant an effort on the part of Jews themselves to secure a new home in some soil where they might live safely and develop freely without the pressure of the unequal struggle imposed upon them

¹ Almost seven million in Russia and what was Russian Poland, and over 300,000 in Roumania.

² This is the title of a work issued by him in German in 1882 (*Auto-Emancipation*), and translated into English under the title *Self-Emancipation*, by A. A. L. Finkenstein, London, 1891.

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through restrictive governmental measures. The project was one born of despair and which was not unnatural in view of an anti-Semitic outbreak in Germany and Austria, which threatened the position and rights of the Jews even in these politically more advanced countries. Pinsker himself was quite indifferent to Palestine as a land of refuge, but as a consequence of the stimulus exerted by his proposed solution of what had become known as the "Jewish Question," organizations were formed throughout Russia, known as "Lovers of Zion," to encourage the colonization of Jews in the Holy Land. These organizations spread to Germany and Austria under the influence of the reaction upon the Jews in those countries of the wave of anti-Semitic prejudice, while sympathy for their oppressed brethren in Eastern lands led to branches being formed in Western Europe, and also in the United States.

With this aspect of Zionism, which merely involves the colonization of Jews in a land which had both historical and sacred associations, Jews everywhere sympathized, even though it was felt that Palestine afforded an outlet for only a small portion of the superfluous population. North and South America received by far the bulk of the Rus-

sian Jews who after 1881 began to emigrate *en masse* from the land of oppression, and during the past three and a half decades over two million Jews have wended their way westward and not eastward.¹ Events have, therefore, moved in a direction quite contrary to the hopes of the "Lovers of Zion," but the movement for Palestinian colonization was not abandoned, and Jewish colonies on a small scale began to be formed in Palestine. The effort made a strong though largely sentimental appeal to Jews as an ameliorative measure of peculiar interest, because of the possibility that it afforded of improving the economic conditions in Palestine itself through the influx of energetic and enthusiastic groups, even if these were not very large ones. Had Zionism confined itself to the purely economic aspect of providing an outlet, even though a limited one, for the overflow of the Jewish population in Russia, there would never have arisen any differences of opinion as to the beneficial character of a movement aiming to establish Jewish colonies organized on the basis of autonomous government in a country that would benefit thereby. The sentimental background to such colonies would have given the movement addi-

should
be here

¹ According to the statistics in the *American Jewish Year-Book* for 1918-19, p. 345 (Philadelphia, 1919).

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tional force without introducing any disturbing factor.

The first Jewish colony was established in Palestine in 1870 by the Alliance Israelite Universelle, the first Zionist colony in 1882. Others soon followed. The project was largely aided by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, of Paris, but it is interesting to note that those colonies flourished best which were formed and maintained by the enthusiasm and devotion of the colonists themselves. At present there are some forty Jewish colonies in various parts of Palestine, with a total population of somewhat over 10,000.¹ Small as this number is in comparison with the general population of Palestine and Syria, the Jewish colonies have nevertheless left their mark on the country. Modern methods of agriculture have been introduced, and an agricultural experiment station has been established at Athlit; and with that keen intellectual ambition which is a pronounced trait among Jews everywhere, schools have sprung up in connection with the colonies.²

¹ See Appendix No. 18 in Nawratzki, *Die Juedische Kolonization Palaestinas* (Leipzig, 1914), which is the most comprehensive work on the subject.

² See the article on "The Educational Institutions of Palestine" by M. Mnuchin in *Kadimah* (New York, 1918, Federation of American Zionists), pages 75-132.

Encouragement has also been given, by the side of agriculture, to the cultivation of the technical arts. The most notable achievement in this respect is the Bezalel School at Jerusalem, in which throughout the year over four hundred persons are engaged in learning and practicing industrial occupations, weaving, carpentry, copper, brass, ivory and silver work, lace making, lithography and the like, while more recently a Jewish Technical Institute has been established on the basis of a considerable endowment at Haifa.

An entirely new direction, however, was given to the Zionistic movement through the introduction of the political factor. This was the work of the late Dr. Theodor Herzl,¹ who may be regarded as the founder of political Zionism, which, quite distinct from the religious and economic phases, has as its ultimate aim the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State. In 1896 Herzl launched the new movement by publishing his monograph on the "Jewish State,"² in which as the solution of the Jewish Question, the organization of the Jews as

¹ Born in Budapest in 1860, died in Vienna 1904, Dr. Herzl was a writer and journalist by profession, and for many years associated with the leading paper of Vienna, the *Neue Freie Presse*.

² English translation by Sylvie d'Avigdor (London, 1896).

a nationalistic unit was proposed, with a view of creating a political center for the reestablishment of a Jewish Nation. Herzl reached this rather remarkable conclusion as the result of his interpretation of the cause of the difficulties which the Jews encountered even in those countries in which they had been accorded political rights. Convinced that the existence of a "Jewish Question" in the enlightened nineteenth century was due in its last analysis to the fact that the Jews actually formed a separate nationality, his thought was centered on the creation of a visible focus for this Jewish nationality. Through the reestablishment of the Jews as a nation, the bond which in Herzl's view was the real tie binding them together would not only be strengthened, but would become an active force through diplomatic pressure and other means exerted by a real Jewish State, in securing protection for Jews everywhere. The plan of a Jewish State, it will be seen, was in one respect merely the extension of Pinsker's project of self-emancipation, but Herzl sought to attain the aim in view through laying the chief emphasis on what he considered the nationalistic bond uniting Jews wherever they may

A second edition by J. de Haas was published in New York in 1904.

be found. Herzl in thus striking the national note gave an entirely new turn to the Zionistic movement, and since the first Zionistic Congress held at Basel in 1897, through Herzl's energetic efforts, the political note has been the dominant one in the Zionistic movement, attaching to itself both the religious and the economic aspects in such a way as to secure a far more general cooperation for the ultimate aim of political Zionism. But on the other hand, political Zionism has brought to a practical issue questions which hitherto had been of more academic and theoretical interest, whether the Jews actually were a nation, and if so, whether it was desirable for them to reorganize themselves in a political sense after having ceased to be a nation from the political point of view for over 2000 years.

Such, then, are the three aspects of Zionism which need to be borne in mind in order to reach an understanding of the present situation.

Religious Zionism should demand the respect of those who cannot accept the doctrine on which it rests. Being purely an ideal, it is an impressive dream — and also innocuous. Economic Zionism, involving the further development of Jewish colonization in Palestine, is a movement that merits encouragement and aid in every possible way, not only

because it offers free and happy development for Jews attracted for one reason or the other to the Holy Land, but also because it directly conduces to the improvement of economic conditions in Palestine itself. Political Zionism, however, is an entirely different matter and must be viewed from a totally different angle. It involves not only difficulties, as the Zionists themselves recognize, but also dangers which in the opinion of non-Zionists are sufficiently serious to condemn the entire movement as unfortunate and as threatening the position of Jews throughout the world. Before taking up certain fundamental objections to political Zionism it is necessary for us to trace the three aspects of Zionism, which thus coalesce in the most recent political phase, to their roots.

II

THE ROOTS OF MODERN ZIONISM

IN tracing modern Zionism to its source we discover three factors contributing in about equal proportions to its rise and growth, to wit: the persistence of the longing of orthodox and also of unorthodox Jews for the old homeland; secondly, the persistence of the retention of the nationalistic aspect to Judaism, even though inconsistent with the basis on which that religion rests; and thirdly, the conditions under which Jews were formerly forced to live and under which to a large extent they still live in countries like Russia, Roumania and Poland. Let us consider these three roots of Zionism.

First, let us not undervalue the force of sentiment in swaying human lives. Amiel, the French thinker, says¹ that "the decisive events of the world take place in the intellect." I should be inclined to assign a still higher place to sentiment as perhaps the most powerful incentive to human action; and Zionism is an illustration in point.

¹ *Journal Intime* under date of Dec. 28, 1880.

“ If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning ;
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth,
If I remember thee not ;
If I set not Jerusalem
Above my chiefest joy.”¹

Thus sang a Zionist of about 2500 years ago in enforced exile in Babylonia, to which he, with his fellow-countrymen, had been deported by the Babylonian ruler Nebuchadnezzar II in 586 B. C. Despite the vicissitudes through which the Jews have passed during the past two millenniums, despite the changes that have come over Palestine itself, that longing has persisted and is an essential factor in modern Zionism, swaying both those to whom the return of the Jews to Palestine, to be reconstituted there as a nation, is a doctrine of religious faith, as well as those who view the hoped for reorganization of the Jews as a nation purely as a political measure, constituting, according to them, the logical solution of what is commonly termed the “ Jewish Question.” Zionism thus makes its appeal to the unorthodox Jew as well as to the one for whom Zionism is a part of his religious faith.

There is assuredly something impressive, some-

¹ Psalm 137, 5-6.

thing romantic and picturesque, in the thought of a people that two millenniums ago was a nation coming back, after wanderings throughout the world, to its ancient home, there to lead again the life so eloquently pictured in the pages of the Old Testament. The possibility of the fulfillment of a hope that has persisted for so long a period stirs the imagination; and all the more so at the present moment, when other nations, like the Poles, the Czechs, the Slavs, the Armenians, are about to regain a national independence that they had lost. If Poland is to be given back to the Poles, Bohemia to be restored to the Bohemians, and Armenia is to be reorganized for the Armenians — why not Palestine for the Jews? The argument gains apparent force from the feelings of Christian believers who have stepped forth as Zionists, and who are encouraging the movement for a return of the Jews to what was once their native land, though strangely enough, Jewish Zionists are apt to overlook the important fact that from the Christian point of view the restoration of Palestine is the prelude to the second coming of Jesus, and that this will be followed by the disappearance of the Jews through their acceptance of the Messiah whom they once rejected. Insofar as official and unofficial Christian-

ity is interested in Zionism, it is because it may be expected to lead to the ultimate triumph of the New Covenant over the old. Christian Zionists favor Jewish Zionism as a step leading not to the perpetuation but to the disappearance of the Jews. In this respect the Christian believer places himself, though, of course, involuntarily, on almost the same plane as the anti-Semitic agitators of Germany and Austria who should, consistently, be most enthusiastic Zionists, since the movement, if successful, would afford the possibility of getting rid at least of the "presence" of the Jews scattered among European nations. But of this aspect more anon.

More than this, Zionism makes its appeal to the unorthodox Christian who is subject to the sway of romantic sentiment. One need only recall George Eliot's eloquent portrayal of the sentiment in *Daniel Deronda* to recognize its influence even on one who had thrown off all belief in the doctrines of Christianity. She makes one of the characters in her novel voice the nationalistic hope in the following terms.

"Let the torch of visible community be lit! Let the reason of Israel disclose itself in a great outward deed, let there be another great migration, another choosing of Israel to be a nationality, whose members

may still stretch to the ends of the earth, even as the sons of England and Germany, whom enterprise carries afar, but who still have a national hearth and a tribunal of national opinion. . . . Let the central fire be kindled again, and the light will reach afar. . . . The sons of Judah have to choose, that God may again choose them. The Messianic time is the time when Israel shall will the planting of the national ensign.”

George Eliot reveals her own feelings in those words.

We need have no quarrel with the sincere Christian believer whose sympathy with Zionism involves the fulfillment of a hope to which he has clung with a persistency equal to that of the orthodox Jew, who never fails to include in his prayers the hope of the restoration of Jerusalem as the religious center of the Jews. We should in a similar spirit respect this doctrine of orthodox Judaism, though unable to subscribe to it, but this must not deter us from recognizing the source of this doctrine, and if we do so we will see the serious mischief that the Zionist longing is bound to work when it is *divorced* from its attachment to religion, as is done by the leaders of political Zionism, particularly by the American and English leaders and by many of those who have become Zionists just because of this di-

voiced. Through this divorce Zionism becomes a political question fraught with mischief, confusion and dangers. I have not now in mind the fact that these leaders of political Zionism, and many of their followers, have not the slightest intention of abandoning their citizenship in the country to which they belong and where they enjoy as loyal citizens the full rights and privileges of their fellows, though this aspect of the movement cannot be entirely ignored. Can one imagine Moses, who inaugurated the first Zionistic movement, convening a congress and saying in his presidential address to his followers, "You cross the Red Sea, and plunge into the wilderness, while I remain behind at the comfortable court of Pharaoh"? Can one for a moment conceive of Joseph Smith gathering the Mormons around him and *sending* them out to found a new state in Utah, instead of *leading* them there? That is not the way in which great movements are inaugurated or carried out. Those who profess to be Zionists but who have no intention of attaching themselves to the movement are merely Zionists by proxy. I have in mind rather those who profess to be Zionists and intend to go to Palestine, but for whom Zionism is a political movement, who look at it purely from its supposed nationalistic point of

view, who want to see Jews organized as a separate group, to recreate a Jewish nation, to bring into being what they call a Jewish culture, to reintroduce Hebrew not because it is a sacred tongue in which the greatest religious contributions of the Jews are couched, but as a national language, so that the Jews may be in every respect a distinct nationalistic unit. Against this conception of Zionism, which is the chief, aye, the dominating, note in the movement, heard above all other sounds, I venture to set up the thesis that while Zionism as a doctrine of faith is intelligible, and Zionism as an economic scheme to promote agricultural colonies in Palestine is timely and should be encouraged by all interested in the welfare of such Jews as wish to settle in Palestine, Zionism as a political measure is an anachronism.

Now, why can one be so positive in maintaining this thesis? Simply because the second root of Zionism, which furnishes us also with the reason for the persistence of the sentiment which we have seen to be the first root, is to be found in the conditions prevailing throughout antiquity, which always interpreted religion in terms of nationality. In contrast to the modern point of view which looks upon a religion as a concern of the *individual*, antiquity made religion an affair of the *group*. As a

survival from this earlier status of religion, Judaism retained a double aspect, religious on the one side, with the nationalistic aspiration attached to it on the other. With the opening of the new era in which we live, the nationalistic attachment disappeared from the consciousness of the Jews living in lands in which they had obtained full political rights, though it continued to survive in the form of the orthodox doctrine of a restoration of the people, to be brought about, however, not through a political Zionistic movement, but as the fulfillment of a prophetic hope, which will come to pass as part of the Divine plan of the Deity especially concerned for His "chosen people." This double aspect of religion, religion as an affair of the group and religion as a matter between the individual and his conscience, requires some further explanation.

Until comparatively recent times there existed as an inherent feature of political organization in all European countries, a close union between Church and State; and as a survival of this condition we still find, even in such advanced democracies as England and Holland, an established church, recognized as the official one, though with freedom of worship and conscience for all non-conformist denominations as they are called. Now, how did

such a union come about? The answer is that the union is the direct outcome of the view of religion which prevailed everywhere throughout antiquity and which assumed that every country was under the special protection of some god or gods. *Every* nation in antiquity regarded itself as a chosen people, singled out by some deity as his very own, though in reality it was the people who chose the god; and from this point of view religion was necessarily interpreted in terms of the solidarity of the group. The gods of Greece were the gods of the Greek people. The individual entered into consideration merely as a member of the group. The concern of the gods was primarily for the group and, as a corollary, the jurisdiction of the gods was limited to the district in which a group lived. It was considered perfectly natural that every people should have its own god or gods; as natural as that a people should have its own language and its peculiar customs. From this it followed that only those who were Greeks could worship Greek gods. It was presumptuous and sacrilegious for others to do so, since the Greek gods were concerned only with the Greek group. Citizenship was likewise linked to nationality, for no one could be a Greek citizen who was not a Greek by descent or had become Greek

by intermarriage with someone who was Greek. Religion, nationality and citizenship thus formed a triple wall sharply separating a political group from a neighboring one. Extension of Greek sovereignty, especially after the period of Alexander the Great after the middle of the fourth century before this era, introduced some modifications of this hide-bound order of things, but for all that the prevailing belief continued to be that religion as the concern of the group was inseparable from nationality. Even the still larger scope of the Roman Empire, after the imperialistic policy was in full swing, could not conceive of a *Civis Romanus* who was not also a worshipper of the Roman gods. The tribal god might by extension of Roman sovereignty become a deity of almost universal sway, but he would for all that retain his function of recognizing the political group who constituted his worshippers, simply on the ground that they belonged to the State over which his jurisdiction extended.

Religion and nationality were the two sides of a medallion. This was the case among all nations of antiquity, and such a conception of religion accounts for the fact also that the welfare of the individual plays such a secondary rôle in most ancient religions. Prayers and incantations make

their appeal on behalf of the people as a whole. The gods are to bring victory in war, to secure good crops for the country and to afford relief from pestilence, but the specifically individual needs are conspicuous by their absence from the practical side of the ritual. The king appears to be the only individual who has a place in religion, and that merely because the ruler, as standing nearer to the gods — frequently regarded indeed as a direct descendant of the gods — affects the welfare of the group. Upon his good relations to the gods the happiness and prosperity of the group depended. If things go well with the king, it is a proof of divine favor extended to the people and, correspondingly, a misfortune to the ruler or to his household affects the entire group.

The ancient Hebrews formed no exception to the rule. They had a national deity whom they called Yahweh,¹ who was *their* protector, and whose control was *limited* to the territory which the Hebrews could call their own. They were the chosen people of this national protector, precisely as groups around them had been chosen by some other god.

¹ Or Jahweh, as the name may also be written. The writing with Y is preferable in an English transliteration of the name. See note on page 31.

This view prevailed in the days of David, who complains that when he was driven out of his country by the enmity of Saul, he was forced out of the presence of Yahweh.¹ David could not worship the national deity in the land of the Philistines, because that district lay outside of Yahweh's domain. Jerusalem becomes Yahweh's city, and the Temple there his dwelling-place, and, precisely as among the Greeks, only those who were Hebrews could worship in the central sanctuary of Yahweh and in the shrines of this deity scattered throughout that part of the country which belonged to the Hebrews.

But in the ninth century before our era a movement begins which results in an entirely new conception of religion, a conception which was destined to cut the bond between religion and nationality, and which ultimately led to the view of religion prevalent in our days as the concern of the individual and not of the group. This striking departure was inaugurated by a body of itinerant preachers who became known as Prophets. They began by proclaiming that Yahweh is unlike other gods, that he searches the hearts and punishes the wrong-doers, that his concern for the group is con-

¹ I Samuel 26, 19.

ditioned not upon caprice or upon carrying out ritualistic obligations, but upon the obedience of his followers to certain principles involving ethical distinctions between right and wrong. These Prophets, addressing themselves to their people, naturally did not ignore the group, but they boldly announced that Yahweh had rejected his people because of the callousness of the rulers, because of the oppression of the poor by the rich, because of the prevailing injustice in the courts of justice, because crime was rampant. Sin was looked upon as disloyalty to Yahweh, who was determined to destroy his people without mercy unless they would mend their ways. Amos, the earliest of this new class of teachers, declares that because of their sins Yahweh has decided that "the end has come upon my people Israel; I will not pardon them any more."¹ Hosea makes the same prophecy of the rejection of the people.² Isaiah exceeds both these Prophets in the vehemence of his denunciation, and emphasizes with particular force that sacrifices and tribute are an abomination to Yahweh, that he does not want his worshippers to defile his holy place by coming there with unclean hands.³

¹ Amos 8, 1.

² Isaiah 1, 13-17.

³ Hosea, Chap. 4.

Now that was a new language, one that had never been heard before. Its significance — at first hardly conscious to the Prophets themselves — lay in the emphasis which it placed on the conduct of the individual as the test of religion. Under the old view prevailing throughout antiquity, the individual entered into consideration only as a member of the group. Under the new view the conditions were reversed, and the group entered into consideration as representing an entity composed of individuals.

It was this movement that led to Judaism in the historical sense, that is to say, a religion based upon a monotheistic conception of divine government and making the conduct of the individual the test of religious life. It is doubtful whether at first the Prophets actually did conceive of Yahweh as the *only* god, but their teaching that Yahweh imposed justice and righteous conduct as an obligation upon his followers necessarily led to the view which transformed the national Yahweh into a universal Jehovah. A more definite step in that direction was taken after the destruction of the Jewish State by a Babylonian monarch, and we thus see Judaism emerging as the butterfly out of the chrysalis of Hebrew nationalism at the time of its extinction. The belief in a God of universal scope concerned

for all mankind cuts the bond between religion and nationality.

Prophets
It is a fact of the utmost significance that the great contribution of the Jews to the world's spiritual treasury was made not while the national life was flourishing, but as it was ebbing away. The Prophets with their revolutionary doctrines made their appearance when the southern Kingdom was beginning to show symptoms of decline, and the movement reached its height after this kingdom had disappeared and the national existence of the southern Kingdom was threatened. The religion of the Prophets is the swan song of ancient Hebraism, and the example of a people flourishing without a national background had to be furnished to the world in order to bring the new conception of religion to fruition, which divorced religion from nationality and made it solely the expression of the individual's aspiration for the higher life and for communion with the source of all being. The ancient Hebrews disappeared. It was the Jews, as we should call the people after the Babylonian Exile, who survived, and they survived despite the fact that they never recovered their national independence in the full sense of the word.

This, to be sure, was not made manifest at once,

and to the superficial observer it might seem that when, under the mild rule of Cyrus, conqueror of Babylon, the Jews were permitted to return to their native country and to establish a Temple cult, the nation was actually being reconstituted. As a matter of fact, the political life of the Jews was kept safely under the control of the Persian governor of Palestine; though the Jews were recognized as forming a political unit. This was in accord with the policy of Cyrus which, in contrast to Babylonian imperialism that aimed to crush the national life of conquered nations, favored the granting of as much autonomy to a subdued people as was consistent with the recognition of Persian supremacy. Cyrus, and to a certain extent also his successors, seemed particularly anxious not to interfere with the religious life in the countries that came under the Persian sway; and since religion and nationality were closely yoked, the permission granted to the Jews to reorganize their cult seemed also to afford an opportunity for the renewal of national existence. To a certain extent this was the case, but ardent Jews whose longings for Zion are so eloquently voiced in many a Psalm, must have been conscious of the fact that the nationalistic aspiration had assumed a secondary rôle, trailing behind the religious boon

of being permitted to appear again in the presence of Yahweh in His rebuilt sanctuary in the city which Yahweh had chosen as His abiding place. Whether these ardent religious followers of the new Judaism also realized the further implication that the religion had actually changed the people from a political to a religious unit is doubtful. Some of the more advanced minds may have felt the profound difference between the purely national aspirations and such as were connected primarily with carrying out the religious ideals of the Prophets. For the masses, however, the difficulties involved in wrenching the political from the religious life, so entirely unheard of in antiquity, accounts for the strange phenomenon that we now encounter a Prophet also turning Priest, despite the inherent difference between the functions of the two. Ezekiel (c. 592–570 B. C.), who speaks with the fervor of an Isaiah, has also the ardent patriotism of a Jeremiah. He sketches a plan¹ for the religious reorganization of Israel which is so dominated by the priestly ideal that from Ezekiel to Ezra (c. 440 B. C.) who perfects the Code that creates a theocratic state, is a natural step. Ezra's Code, which is embodied in Exodus, Leviticus and Num-

¹ Ezekiel, Chaps. 40–48.

bers, was subsequently combined with the two earlier codes, one in Exodus and the other in the Book of Deuteronomy. These codes encased in a framework of early traditions and of tribal experiences became the present Pentateuch, which served at once as the basis of religious life and at the same time recognized the solidarity of the Jews as a political unit.

From the point of view of such writers as the so-called Second Isaiah and the other writing Prophets of the post-exilic period who followed in the wake of the pre-exilic speaking Prophets,¹ the reconstitution of the Jews as a political unit (though without complete independence) was a misfortune, for it once more attached the religion to what remained of the national life. Naturally, the Jews felt encouraged under the mild policy of Persian rule to look forward to regaining their complete independence, and, though Persia saw to it that this hope should not lead to any definite efforts, yet the hope remained and continued to exercise a profound influence. But with the Jews occupied with the renewal of purely national aspirations, the broader outlook of post-exilic Prophets, whose gaze

¹ On this contrast between speaking and writing Prophets, see Jastrow, *A Gentle Cynic*, p. 48 *et seq.*

was directed towards the time when the supreme Author of all being would become, through the example set by the Jews, the sole object of worship of mankind, was obscured.

The universal Jehovah¹ had not entirely put aside the rule of the tribal Yahweh. Yahweh was still viewed as the special protector of His chosen people by the side of His traits as the God of universal scope. The crisis came in the days of Jesus, who, as the successor of the Hebrew Prophets, drew the logical conclusion from their premises and substituted for the national ideal that of the "Kingdom of God." "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's."² By such a single saying Jesus broke definitely with all nationalistic aims, which even during the period of Roman control, strict and complete as it was, the Jews did not entirely abandon.

¹ The name Jehovah, which is not older than the twelfth century of our era, is a combination of the name Adonai "Lord" with the consonants of YHWH (or JHWH) forming the name of the tribal deity Yahweh. As early as the fourth century B.C. the general name Adonai for deity was substituted for the personal one Yahweh, under the influence of the growing strength of the monotheistic conception which found it distasteful to apply the name of an old tribal deity to a spiritually conceived Power of universal sway.

² Mark 12, 17.

Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans a generation after Jesus, in 70 A. D. Subsequent efforts of rebellion failed — though not without a heroic struggle. The last vestiges of Jewish independence disappeared about 135 A. D. and the Jews scattered in all directions, though long before this Jewish settlements in considerable number were being founded in various parts of the ancient world — in Babylonia, in upper Egypt, particularly at Alexandria, in Asia Minor and even in Greece. But wherever the Jews went they carried with them, as a survival of their hopes, the Zionistic longing. Bound by a tradition from which they could not extricate themselves, they continued to echo through the ages the plaint of the Psalmist,

“ If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning;
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth,
If I remember thee not.”

Evolution in human society never completely substitutes the new for the old, but carries part of the old era into the new epoch. Judaism represents a new conception of religion which makes religion an affair of the individual and a bond uniting the individual to the rest of mankind. Zionism rests upon the sway of the older conception which attached re-

ligion to the national life, and so we have the strange phenomenon of a religion which declares through one of its exponents,

“Have we not all one Father?”¹

and which looks forward to the time when the Temple of Jehovah will be called

“A House of Prayer for all peoples,”²

yet retaining as a doctrine of a faith which eschews nationality a hope for the restoration of the national life of a little group within a restricted area. Judaism and Zionism are thus mutually exclusive, but for all that passed down the ages linked to one another as inseparable partners.

This, then, is the second root of Zionism — the survival in Judaism of the early conception of religion which attached it closely to nationalistic limitations, and which continued to interpret even a religion universalistic in its implication in terms of the solidarity of the group. So strong was the hold of the ancient conception of religion that the very people to whom we owe the divorce of religion from nationality, preserved and emphasized the union of the two factors straight through the cen-

¹ Malachi 2, 10.

² Isaiah 56, 7.

turies until the advent of the new era in which we live. Strange indeed this double aspect of Judaism must appear to those who overlook the historic causes which brought it about. Strange also that the Jews themselves did not recognize that they survived the extinction of national life and their dispersion through the Western world, because they had become *more* than a nation.

It was natural, however, for the Jews thus to continue to combine their religion with the hope for a restoration of the national life, natural even though inconsistent with the basis upon which the religion rested, for the conditions under which the Jews were forced to live in the lands in which they settled made them homeless; and here we strike the third root of Zionism.

Christianity, as we have seen, broke at its foundation with Jewish nationalism. It definitely cut the thread that bound religion to the limitations inherent in associating religion with the group. The significance of the teachings of Jesus lies just in this circumstance — that he brought the nationalistic conception of religion as preached by the Prophets and which made religion solely a matter between the individual and his conscience more definitely and in

an uncompromising form into the foreground. It is an error to suppose that the Jews rejected the religious *teachings* of Jesus. They *could* not have done so, for these teachings breathed the same spirit as those of their own Prophets, but the weight of tradition and of their established attitude of mind, added to the pressure of the religious conception current about them, was sufficiently great to prevent them from accepting the *implications* of the position taken by Jesus, though even these were identical with those of the Prophets. The Jews could not conceive of a Messiah who was not also a nationalist. Jesus could not conceive of Judaism except as detached from Zionistic longings — and so the inevitable break took place. When St. Paul came to give the doctrinal setting to the teachings of Jesus and to interpret the meaning of his life with its tragic end, he laid the chief emphasis on the salvation of the individual through the acceptance of the belief in Jesus. The sins of the world were washed away through the blood of Jesus as a vicarious offering for mankind. Every individual was offered the opportunity of securing salvation for his soul by accepting Jesus as his saviour. The new conception of religion gained

the day, and Christian apostles travelled into all lands to preach the new faith of individual salvation.

N.D. But strangely enough Christianity itself succumbed to the Zionistic temptation of an alliance with the old nationalism, though in a form that at first appeared to be international. Christianity became the official religion of Rome. A union was established between the two which led to the conception of the Church Universal as a complement to the ambition of the Roman Empire for universal sovereignty. Rome and Christianity — a State Universal and a Church Universal — thus became linked to each other. The individualism of the Christian scheme of salvation was overshadowed by the official recognition of Christianity as the State religion. The Church usurped the place once occupied by the old Roman paganism. Religion became once more an affair of the solidarity of the group, and the underlying principle involved was not affected by the circumstance that the new grouping aimed at universal jurisdiction. Largely through the official status given to Christianity, the young and vigorous religion spread throughout the Roman Empire, and when that Empire broke up into the states out of which eventually the present Eu-

European nationalities were to evolve, the union of Church and State survived *logically* as a legacy of this indissoluble link between the State and the Church universal. Church and State are merely different terms for religion and nationality; they represent religion and nationality writ large. Christian Europe continued to maintain, as a survival of the past, that only one who had accepted the official religion could be a member of the State. There was, to be sure, an advance in this respect, that while the older order, prevailing in antiquity, prescribed e.g. that only a Greek could worship Greek gods, under the new order the proposition was turned around and adherence to the Church was made the condition of citizenship. Under the new order any one could become a member of the official religious body, whereas Greek citizenship was limited to those who were born Greeks or who had entered into the Greek body politic through intermarriage. Beyond this advance, however, there was no difference between the old and the new. The underlying principle in both was the same.

In this way Christianity assumed a double aspect precisely as did Judaism, though each through different circumstances and for different reasons. Under this double aspect which bound citizenship to

a confession of a certain faith, even though that faith aimed to be universalistic, the Jews were necessarily excluded from participation in the political life about them, and became a people without a country; and so strong is the social instinct which impels people to associate themselves with the unfolding of political activities that the Jews, scattered throughout Christian Europe, clung to their nationalistic hopes as the only substitute at their disposal for a real country. Man as a social and political being cannot live without a country. If he has no real one he creates an ideal one. The continued attachment of a Zionistic longing to Judaism, though not, as we have seen, involved in the basis upon which the faith rested and indeed inconsistent with such a basis, thus appears likewise as a logical necessity — as well as a survival — resulting from the conditions under which the Jews by the exclusiveness of the States organized on a basis of union between Church and State were compelled to live.

Here, then, is the third root of Zionism, the exclusion of the Jews for so many centuries from participation in the political life that hummed around them. The situation was most humiliating for the steadily increasing numbers of Jews in all

European countries, stigmatized as they were as political outcasts and compelled to live in cramped ghettos; and even in these living prisons they were exposed to the contumely of the outside hostile mob. The moral degradation of the conditions under which the Jews thus passed their lives necessarily reacted on their character. While it strengthened, on the one hand, the bond uniting those who suffered in common, it created on the other a spirit of clannishness, and produced other faults which are necessarily bred in such an atmosphere. A people living in a hostile atmosphere, obliged to be ever on their guard against attacks and at the mercy of government officials who in return for bribes were willing to grant favors that connived at existing laws, naturally develop a phase of shrewdness born of the instinct of self-preservation. This in turn engenders personal qualities which are not attractive and breeds methods in business and other dealings with their own kin or with strangers that will not stand a severe ethical test. The defects to be found in the character of the Russian Jew, upon which even writers who harbor no prejudices have not infrequently dwelt — though generalizations always embody only semi-truths — are precisely those that are evolved among a people, living in a coun-

try in which they have no rights. It were a miracle were it otherwise. Sufferings through intolerance, alternating with frightful persecutions, thus served to intensify the longing for redemption through divine intervention. The Zionistic hope became for the Jews the only rock to which they could cling in the storm that raged about them — the beacon light that illumined the darkness of their lives. It was this hope alone that enabled them to retain their faith in a protecting Providence amidst the injustice of which they were the perpetual victims.

The three roots of Zionism thus turn out to be: the force of sentiment assuming an increasingly picturesque and romantic tinge; the persistency in Judaism, as a plank in its religious platform, of the older conception of religion as involving the solidarity of the group; and the combination between Christianity and nationalism surviving until the threshold of the new era in the organization of the European States, and which, excluding the Jews from citizenship and submitting them to all manner of suffering and persecution, served to maintain among Jews the Zionistic longing as the only means of satisfying the need of the individual to belong to *some* country.

III

THE NEW ERA AND REFORMED JUDAISM

WE are now in a position to show how incongruous political Zionism is with the new era that began at the end of the eighteenth century, marked by such events as our own Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution. These were symptoms of the approaching end of the epoch marked by the union of Church and State. Christianity was to free itself from continued attachment to the idea of nationality, which tied it officially to a state. The divorce between Church and State which was thus brought about was merely one consequence of the many changes wrought by the new order that was setting in. Religious freedom for the individual which was involved in this divorce was a specific application of the general principle which demanded freedom of mind as well as of conscience; and equally bound up with the new order was the ideal of political freedom that proclaimed the sovereignty of the popular will, and the inherent

right of nations to govern themselves, instead of bearing a yoke imposed upon them.

The force of the new order was irresistible, though the movement for political and religious freedom proceeded more rapidly in some countries than in others. Our own land took the lead and furnished Europe with an example of states banding themselves together to form a union with the recognition of a complete divorce between Church and State. The federation thus formed welcomed to citizenship all who were ready to be loyal to the principles of the Republic. France followed, though not without some reactionary movements which in the end failed. England and Holland, though formally still recognizing an established Church, threw down the barriers excluding non-conformists from citizenship, and even Austria and Germany, though remaining autocratic in their form of government, were forced to make concessions to the onrush of the democratic spirit. As a result of the process of political emancipation which, beginning early in the nineteenth century, extended well into the last quarter, the Jews in all these countries as well as in Greece and Italy and in the Balkan States with the exception of Roumania, were gradually granted full rights of citizenship;

and as they entered upon their new privileges we find among them a corresponding process, more rapid in some countries than in others, but everywhere proceeding steadily, of assimilation on their part to the new political and social conditions thus created. Since their political emancipation the Jews have entered with zest into the political life of the countries in which they live, showing a patriotic zeal and devotion to the welfare of what now became their country, which more than justified the removal of the civic disabilities under which they labored and suffered for so many, many centuries. By that same force of logic which had led them to look to Palestine as the only land which one day they would be able to call their country, they now lost the consciousness of being a separate political unit by gaining as their own the land in which they had cast their lot. That social instinct in man which makes for political organization found its natural expression, and with this the one root of Zionism fell away for all Jews living in lands that had granted them the same privileges and rights of citizenship as their fellows.

Accompanying the political emancipation of Jews there arose a movement within the fold to adapt the external character of Judaism to the new conditions.

The era of Reformed Judaism as the movement came to be called, set in — inevitably so. We err completely in looking at the movement as a destructive one; it is essentially constructive. Its main aim is the adaptation of the old religion to the new age, which affected not only the political and social life of the Jews, but also brought about through progress in research and through discoveries more particularly in the realm of natural science an entirely new and changed attitude towards life and towards man's relations to the universe. Jews became affected by the spirit of the age precisely and to the same degree as were their fellows in the Christian Church. All the sects of Christianity have during the past century felt the need to set their house in order, to meet the results gleaned in the fields of geology and biology, which revealed the great age of the world and an order in the evolution of life on this planet entirely different from the view which had for so long been traditionally accepted.

The historical and critical survey of the Old and the New Testament swept away likewise established traditions regarding the origin of Biblical books and even regarding their character. Nor was the fundamental doctrine on which Judaism and Christianity

rested, as well as Islam, permitted to escape the implications involved in the new scientific attitude towards the universe and towards the position of man in nature. The Reform movement in Judaism thus had a double character imposed upon it. On the one hand established rites and ceremonies, which were an inheritance of a religion originating in an ancient Oriental environment, no longer made their appeal to Western Jews imbued with Western ideals and the Western spirit; and on the other it had to reinterpret the doctrines of the ancestral religion in accord with the postulates of modern thought, and more particularly to bring the beliefs into line with the conditions of life upon which the Jews had entered.¹

The reformation in Judaism did not, as happened in Christianity, bring about a sharp break between those who aimed to give to the old religion a new form, and those who clung tenaciously to time-honored rites and customs, but those who cut loose from the moorings of tradition moved ever further away from their orthodox brethren in the interpretation of the doctrines and aspirations of Judaism, until to-day the extreme left wing accepts

¹ See for details Philipson, *Reform Movement in Judaism* (Macmillan, New York, 1907).

without reservation the results of the historical criticism of the Old Testament and the postulates from the discoveries in the realm of natural science which have so materially altered fundamental conceptions in the sphere of religion. The ethical ideals of the Hebrew Prophets have been moved into the foreground by Reformed Judaism, and this has not been without its effect also on the orthodox wing, which was forced to make some concessions to the spirit of the age in order to maintain its hold upon its adherents.

Leaving aside aspects of Reformed Judaism which do not concern us here, the most important undercurrent to be detected beneath the external changes in forms and rites is the struggle to throw off the traces of the older view of religion which interprets man's religious aspirations in terms of nationality, and which, as pointed out, Judaism through stress of circumstances carried with it in its winding course through the ages. The Zionistic doctrine as part of the religion lost its *raison d'être* when the Jews became citizens of the country in which they had settled. The social instinct which impels a man to have one country also prevents him from having more than one. The essence of Reformed Judaism, viewed from the standpoint of a student of

history, lies precisely here, that it freed Judaism and the Jews from the double aspect of being bound both by a religious and a political tie. Reformed Judaism logically involved removing from the religion all Zionistic aspects, which we have seen, as a matter of fact, had no place in the new conception of religion for which both Judaism and Christianity from the beginning stood, but which were retained in both through a special series of circumstances. The separation of Church and State in countries that had hitherto been Christian is paralleled by the complete divorce between religion and nationality in Reformed Judaism. The one step necessarily entailed the other. Reformed Judaism viewed in this light as the expression of the spirit of the age thus cut away the second root of Zionism. Once more the thread between religion and nationality was snapped. Judaism was brought into consistent agreement with its fundamental principle of a faith which, breaking all national and racial barriers, proclaimed religion to be the regulation of the life of the individual according to the dictates of his own conscience, with the religion itself based upon a belief in a Providence whose care was extended over all mankind. The old doctrine of a chosen people, in so far as it survived into the new

era, was thus given a different interpretation. From having been a special privilege accorded them by a tribal deity, it became a solemn obligation, imposed by their historical position, to spread the doctrine of divine unity in the government of the universe and to exemplify the tenets of their religion by their conduct in life. There remains, then, of the three roots of Zionism which we above discussed only one, the force of the time-honored sentiment attaching itself to the memory of distant days when the Jews were a nation living in the land which they had conquered for themselves,

“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning.”

Two main objections to this sentiment when the attempt is made to convert it into action are, in the first place, that it misinterprets the trend of the history of the Jews during the past 2000 years and secondly, that it ignores also the changes that have come over Palestine itself during this period. Before, however, taking up these objections, which may be called fundamental to the endeavor to convert the Zionist sentiment, however impressive, into a political movement, we must face the question which will be naturally raised at this point, why

did a strong Zionistic movement set in a generation ago, *just* at the time when the process involving the removal of the two other roots, had made such progress and, furthermore, why has modern Zionism taken on such a decided political color which gives to it all the appearance of a revival of a nationalistic sentiment among the Jews?

IV

JEWISH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND ANTI-SEMITISM

NATURALLY, all that has been said in regard to the removal of the two roots of Zionism through the trend of events which set in at the close of the eighteenth century, the definite separation of religion from nationality in Reformed Judaism on the one hand, and on the other the recognition of Jews as fullfledged citizens in all countries organized on a democratic and liberal basis, applies only to those countries in which the separation of Church and State has practically been accomplished and all political distinctions among the classes of inhabitants removed. In lands like Russia and Roumania, the three roots of Zionism still exert their full force. It was, therefore, natural for a Zionistic movement to originate in Russia despite the advent of the new era, and it is significant that even at the present time the movement gathers its main strength from the adherence of those Jews who have either directly experienced, in Russia and Roumania, the

martyrdom of being political outcasts and of being victims of persecution, or who though escaping to lands of freedom are weighed down by their recollections and at the same time stirred by a natural sympathy for the millions of their less fortunate brethren who still languish in a condition which represents a modern equivalent to the ancient Egyptian bondage. Bearing in mind that Russian and Roumanian Jews together, form one half of the fifteen million Jews in the world, it is not surprising to find that an effort to ameliorate the condition of so many millions should secure a large adherence among Russian and Roumanian Jews living outside of these countries. Modern Zionism at its inception was distinctly an outcome of conditions prevailing in Russia and Roumania. It was because the Jews in these lands had no country that Zionism arose to meet man's social need to belong to some country. Zionism in its modern aspects as it took shape in Russia in the 80's of the preceding century was also an expression of intellectual stirrings. Curiously enough, while Russia is the stronghold of Jewish orthodoxy, due in part at least to the backward state of political life in that country, it is also the center of a remarkably advanced intellectualism among large bodies of Jews who have, despite ad-

verse circumstances, emancipated themselves from orthodox surroundings and have experienced the stimulating contact with the new scientific spirit of the age, as well as the movement for freer political life that culminated, after a long struggle, in our own days in the recent Russian revolution. Because of this intellectualism in conjunction with their religious emancipation, these Russian Jews have felt the humiliation to which they have been subjected all the more keenly. Excluded practically from all direct participation in both intellectual and political activities — barring exceptional instances — they became sharply self-conscious of the stigma attaching to them as Jews, irrespective of the fact that they had in most cases thrown off all connection with the ancestral religion.

Seeking for an explanation of the fact that despite all efforts on their part to become part and parcel of the native population they were nevertheless regarded as aliens, they found a justification for their self-consciousness in the supposition that they were denied the rights of citizenship and treated as political outcasts, because they represented a distinct nationality, foreign to the body politic about them.

This same self-consciousness explains the spread

of the Zionistic sentiment to Germany and Austria in which countries it began to take strong hold in the closing decade of the last century. Here it was an anti-Semitic outbreak which brought about a recrudescence of Jewish self-consciousness. Theodor Herzl, who became the founder and leader of political Zionism, was himself led to his position by the reaction on himself of the anti-Semitic movement. It was this movement which made him, the once prominent journalist of Vienna, without any affiliations with the religion of his fathers, conscious of the isolated position occupied by the Jews in countries like Germany and Austria, despite the improvement in their political status. He likewise reached the conclusion that the Jews were regarded as a separate entity, not because of their religion but in spite of it. It was not their religion that stamped the Jews as a compact body, but the fact that they belonged to a separate nationality. The interpretation that was thus given to the anti-Semitic movement played directly into the hands of the opponents of the Jews whose hostility, it may be said in passing, was not worthy of so exalted an interpretation.

Jewish self-consciousness thus lies at the bottom of the solution proposed by Herzl and his followers

for the Jewish Question. With a frank confession as his starting-point that the Jews were a distinct nationality, Herzl maintained that the Jews could only regain the respect and esteem of the world by an effort to re-establish themselves as a national group. Hence the "Jewish State" which loomed up in Herzl's mind as a way out of the bewildering maze.¹ By organizing a Jewish State the Jews would force the most powerful weapon of their enemies out of their hands, and it was further maintained that with a national organization and a national center the Jews would be in a position to exercise pressure, backed by diplomatic prestige, to secure protection for Jews living outside of the proposed Jewish State. Herzl did not have in mind at first that this State should necessarily be established in Palestine, but when the Jewish Congress called by him met in Basel in 1897, the Zionist sentiment was so strong and aroused such enthusiasm among the delegates that there was no question of the strength of the movement centering in the romantic attitude towards the old homeland. When at a subsequent Congress a plan for the possible establishment of the Jewish State outside of Palestine was broached, the opposition to it was so

¹ See above, p. 9 *et seq.*

vigorous as almost to cause a break; and later the break did come.¹

The movement, thus resting on a plane of self-consciousness of recent origin and on a sentiment of a time-honored character, spread to other countries because prejudice towards Jews, though in a milder form, showed itself also in such lands as France and to some extent in England as well as in our own country. Many Jews in these countries were led to accept the Zionistic contention that the Jews are a nation, because they too came to ascribe the feeling towards them as Jews to this fact, though these newly fledged Zionists contradicted their own position by virtue of their complete political attachment to the only country which they regarded as their own. It ought to be said also that by far the majority of those who in England and the United States and so far as one can judge also in France (where the movement appears to be weakest) have joined the ranks of political Zionism are to be found among the emigrants from Russia and Poland, who are naturally still swayed by memories of their former condition, or are moved by sympathy with their fellows in accepting the political plank in the Zionistic platform which declares the Jews to

¹ For details, see Gottheil, *Zionism*, pp. 120-142.

be a separate nationality. I say the majority, for I am aware of the fact that some of the leaders of Zionism in the United States and in England do not fall within this category. Barring these leaders — who are a mere handful — it is safe to say that of American and English born Jews or of such who, though not natives, have lived long enough in these countries to have become thoroughly assimilated to prevailing political and social conditions, not five per cent in either country are political Zionists. The movement thus retains most decidedly its character as Russian in origin¹ and is strengthened by the reaction on the Jews of Germany and Austria through the anti-Semitism prevailing in these lands, which despite their intellectual position fell until the end of the war within the category of politically backward countries.

Now the fallacy in the position of the Russian

¹ It is only necessary to scan the list of delegates to the so-called American Jewish Congress, which was held in Philadelphia in December, 1918, and the International Zionist Conference held in February, 1919, in London, to recognize the justification for this statement. It is no reflection on either conference that it was composed in large majority of those who have in recent years come to the United States and England, but the fact is significant that the Philadelphia meeting could not be called a representative American Jewish gathering, nor the one in London a representative English Jewish gathering.

intellectuals in making their Jewish self-consciousness the starting-point for a political Zionism, based upon the supposition that the feelings towards Jews was due to their being a separate people, is obvious; and even more obvious is the false position in which those Jews have placed themselves who became political Zionists in countries in which they had precisely the same rights and obligations as their fellow citizens, but who were led thereto by the influence, direct or indirect, of European anti-Semitism. The prejudice existing against Jews in countries like Germany and Austria and, though to a less extent, even in such as are organized on a purely democratic basis, is essentially *social* in contrast to that existing in former centuries when it was distinctly religious. Social prejudice is irritating; it leads to self-consciousness, but it is not as serious as we often picture it. It would be, if social prejudice against Jews were the only phenomenon of its kind in this world. There is a strong social prejudice against Catholics in many countries, particularly in such where the population is predominately Protestant; and there are many other phases of social prejudice in other countries that might be mentioned, all of which goes to show that social prejudice is so common as to justify one in regard-

ing it as the "touch of nature which makes the whole world kin." There are few, surprisingly few people, Jews or non-Jews, who are free from social prejudice. Most of us have an endless supply that crops out on the most unexpected occasions. The source of this prejudice is the perfectly human, though not for that reason justifiable, feeling that we like people who are like ourselves. We resent the intrusion into the social circle of any one who is or seems to be different from us. It is conceit that in the last analysis underlies social prejudice, and it is perhaps a sad reflection that as long as human nature does not change, social prejudice in some form, directed at those different from ourselves, will continue to exist. At the same time it is some comfort to realize that social prejudices have a tendency to lose their sting as people of different habits and different ways of looking at things, and, if you please, different ways of conducting themselves, are led by force of circumstances to intermingle. A great war, such as the one we have just passed through, has an exhilarating influence in making us more open-minded, more democratic and less clannish. The various elements of a nation are forced into closer contact through the unifying effect of a war, with the inevitable result of our get-

ting rid of at least some of our prejudices, though we need not worry lest we shed them all. Now it is natural that this prejudice should be stronger in countries like Russia and Roumania, where the Jews, deprived of political rights, have always been looked upon as a separate and different group. It is one of the natural, though unfortunate, results of the forced isolation from their fellow beings in which Jews in these countries have for centuries lived, that they have become so different in their ways from the surrounding population. The greater the external differences separating the group from its surroundings, the stronger the social prejudice engendered on both sides — with this difference, to be sure, that the stronger group shows its hostility without any disguise and frequently in a most brutal manner, whereas the weaker must hide its feelings as best it can.

One may also observe a gradual diminution of this kind of prejudice towards Jews in those lands in which they have been admitted to full political life. Even in Germany and Austria anti-Semitism did not lead to such violent outbreaks as in Russia and Roumania, but manifested itself chiefly in petty annoyances, in a polemic of printer's ink in the form of the *brochure*, of which the Germans are so

fond. The chief result of anti-Semitism was to produce a deluge of literature, most of which had an ephemeral vogue. It also had the effect of hindering the Jews in their careers, particularly those who had chosen the professions, but it was after all mild as compared to the manifestations in lands where the Jews were still excluded from the enjoyment of civic rights. As we pass to democratic countries, the social character of the prejudice becomes more clearly manifest, and assumes the still more harmless though annoying form of exclusion from summer hotels and from social clubs.

There is not the slightest warrant, however, for assuming that the prejudice against Jews in any country is due to their being a separate nationality. The political Zionists cannot lay this flattering unction to their souls. They are guilty of self-deception in offering such an explanation. For we must bear in mind that anti-Semitism, as one of the many prejudices of which the world is full and which has been a factor in making converts to Zionism in different countries, has an old, though not an honorable, lineage. It may be traced back to the days of Pharaoh *before* the Jews were a nation, and it crops out in Roman days *after* they had ceased to be one. The main difference between the old and

the new variety lies in the reasons assigned for its existence by those who feel it incumbent to explain their attitude. The Bible tells us that the Egyptians did not like the Hebrews because they were shepherds. The Egyptians did not like to sit down at the same table with these shepherds; they did not belong to the same social set. The Hebrews probably reciprocated this feeling and looked upon the Egyptians, though representatives of a higher culture, as degenerates. The modern anti-Semite seeks to justify his social prejudice by a pseudo-political philosophy regarding race purity, backed, perhaps, by a recollection that he had met some Jews whom he did not like, or who perhaps did not like him. One is reminded of the remark attributed to the late King Edward who, as Prince of Wales, had invited his fashionable tailor to a public reception. The Prince asked the tailor how he was enjoying himself, to which the latter replied: "It's a rather mixed company, Your Royal Highness." "Well," said the Prince, "we cannot all be tailors." The Romans were quite indiscriminating in their social prejudices, and included the Christians with the Jews. They looked upon both as dangerous innovators — religious Bolsheviki — because neither Jews nor Christians would recognize the Roman

gods. In fact, Roman writers speak of Jews and Christians as atheists, because they did not believe in Jupiter.

Now at first sight it might seem that this prejudice was in reality religious, but as a matter of fact the religious opposition to the Jews did not arise until Christianity had become part and parcel of the Roman Empire. Under the old conception of religion as above set forth and which made religion an affair of the group, the one who was not of the same religion was excluded in a social sense. Otherwise, the attitude towards him was one of indifference. There was no religious intolerance under the conditions prevailing in antiquity, because it was regarded as perfectly natural that every country should have its own gods, its own way of worship and its own way of looking at life. When, however, Christianity set up its ideal of a single church of universal sway as a complement to the political theory upon which the Roman Empire rested, the corollary necessarily followed that those who were outside of Christianity were heretics or infidels. The feeling against those who despite all efforts continued to remain outside of the official recognized religion, naturally assumed a more positively hostile character. Christianity became em-

phatically intolerant of those who did not accept the Christian faith. Christian states looked upon them as stiff-necked, stubborn, hopelessly blind, and they treated them accordingly. When persuasion failed persecution set in, and when persecution seemed ineffective they burnt the Jews, as they executed the heretics in their own ranks. But even during the Middle Ages when the religious feelings towards Jews as towards others who were regarded as heretics ran so high, there was always an element of social prejudice involved, and this element remained after the more liberalizing movement of modern times set in.

Now at bottom what does all this social prejudice amount to except that we do not like people who are different from us, who do not believe the same things; do not speak the same language; do not dress in the same way; who have different kinds of names, different looks, differently-shaped heads or noses, who have not our manners, who act differently? Social prejudice may also arise from fear of competition, but whatever its cause or its nature, it cannot be overcome by succumbing to it, and still less by admitting its justification, as the Zionists unwittingly do in proclaiming to the world that the Jews *are* a separate substance in the body politic in

which they live. It is starting at the wrong end to take as one's guide for direction the outburst of those whose anti-Semitism is merely an index of a general reactionary frame of mind. It is not accidental that Treitschke, the soul of the anti-Semitic movement in Germany, was also the one who interpreted the nationalistic trend of Germany in the narrowest spirit, the spirit which led to the predominance of Prussia and Prussian militarism and eventually brought with it the sad downfall of what was once a great nation — and what, we all hope, may again become a nation worthy of the traditions which it had established before entering upon a wrong path. Anti-Semitism *because* it was reactionary and placed the over-emphasis on nationality, was one of the factors that led to the moral collapse of Germany. In other countries, like Austria and France, those who took up the cry of anti-Semitism were likewise those who were found on the side of the reactionaries, in league with the forces opposed to the spirit of the age which ever since the days of Napoleon had been moving towards political liberalism. Surely in view of all this it is the height of absurdity to take the existence of social, or, if you choose, even racial prejudice — though it assumes the proportions of a movement — as a point of de-

parture for the interpretation of the position of the Jews in the world that involves, among other things, as will presently be shown, a misreading of their entire history since the time that they ceased to be a nation in any real sense of the word. It is indeed one of the main charges to be brought against the political Zionists that they entirely neglect this historical factor — in many cases, I believe, through ignorance — in setting up their claim that the Jews, despite the evidence to the contrary, are still a nation, and that the reconstitution of them as a national entity furnishes the only logical solution for what is called the “Jewish Question.”

The traits possessed by modern Jews, both the good and the bad ones, so far as they present any peculiarities or characteristics, are due to the factor which the late James Darmesteter, one of the most distinguished scholars of his day, called “tradition,” the result of living for centuries in close proximity and in imposed isolation from the outside world.¹ Common experiences, under conditions which in the case of the Jews in former centuries meant common sufferings, produce a common out-

¹ See his essay on “Race and Tradition” in *Selected Essays of James Darmesteter*, translated from the French by Helen B. Jastrow (Boston, 1895), pp. 155-177.

look on life. A certain clannishness, on the one side, balanced by strength of will on the other, a marked family attachment, flanked by shrewdness, the fruit of suspicion of a hostile world. Tradition extends its influence even to peculiarities of speech and to physical features, for people who live together are apt to grow alike in appearance. Much, therefore, which passes current for racial or ethnic traits in the supposed separate character of the Jews as a race or nation, is due to totally different causes, which would produce the same results in the case of any other group obliged to live under the same surroundings. In fact the racial factor which is involved in the Zionist contention that the Jews are a nation, has led to considerable confusion in the public mind, in conjunction with the false view which was current a few decades ago as to the advantages of purity of race. Scholars now agree that a pure race is a fiction. All races that have achieved anything are more or less mixed. All great civilizations have been produced by commingling of various racial elements in the population. The Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks and Romans are all mixed races, and so are the modern European nations. The Jews form no exception, and even in Palestine it is more than likely that they

mingled with others than Semites. It is only necessary to regard the various types among Jews at the present time to realize the extent to which this mixture must have proceeded for centuries, despite the unfavorable circumstances which restricted that mixture to a point below the normal. In fact there are no purely *racial* characteristics to distinguish Jews from their surroundings in European countries or in this country, beyond those traits and features which are due to the result of the factor which I have called "tradition."

But the question, for all that, will be asked, are not the Jews a nation by virtue of the fact that they were one during the six centuries (about 1200 to 600 B. C.) of their national independence in Palestine? Let us see.

V

NATIONALITY VERSUS NATION

LORD BRYCE in an illuminating essay on "The Principle of Nationality"¹ emphasizes the distinction between a nationality and a nation. The former is a term expressive of common ethnic descent of a people, though, as we have seen, the *ethnos* need not necessarily be pure and rarely is. A nation, on the other hand, represents a political entity which may consist of a single nationality, but it is also possible,

¹ *Essays and Addresses in Wartime* (London, 1918), Chapter 7.

A friend, who is a keen student of current events, calls my attention in this connection to the unfortunate lack of a suitable term to express the modern idea of a nation as a *political* unit, as against the older view of an ethnic unit. After all, nation and nationality are really synonymous terms, and it is only by an artificial process that we can differentiate between the two as Lord Bryce has done. Inasmuch, however, as no special term exists to express a political unit independent of all ethnic factors, I am obliged to retain the existing terminology, but will endeavor in every instance to make it clear that I mean the political unit, which may be composed of one nationality or of various nationalities or of many nationalities.

and under modern conditions more common, for several nationalities to be represented in the nation. A single common nationality forms the starting-point for the development of a State, but it is not the goal and certainly does not represent the highest conception of political life. Great Britain forms one nation, but it is composed of three nationalities, English, Scotch and Welsh. In the case of Belgium we have a national entity composed of two nationalities, Flemish and Walloon. In Switzerland we have a state organized into a nation consisting of three nationalities, Teutonic, Gallic and Italic, combining to form a single nation, while our own country is an example of the mixture and combination of many nationalities from all parts of the world to form one American nation. Germany, France and Italy, on the other hand, are nations formed by a predominating single nationality, though even in these lands, as also in Poland and Bohemia, there is a considerable admixture of other nationalities, which suggests that it may be an error in dealing with the problem of the reconstitution of Poland and Bohemia, which have large admixtures of other nationalities, particularly German, to lay too great a stress on the factor of single nationality. There ought to be no such thing within

a modern state as the separation of a population into a majority and a minority nationality, and certainly not a segregation of that minority as a separate national unit. *All* the elements of which a country is composed together form the nation in a state organized on democratic principles.

We see in the difficulties that have already arisen between the rival claims of the Jugo-Slavs and the Italians for the domination of a certain section of the Dalmatian Coast, how difficult it is in these days of close intercourse between countries to settle problems of sovereignty on the basis of nationality alone. The natural trend in a democratic age is towards mixture of nationalities to form a nation.

Another danger involved in laying too strong an emphasis on a single nationality as the basis of national life is that it engenders chauvinism and false patriotism. France in the past has suffered from this evil because of the predominating single nationality in that country; and modern Germany is a significant and disastrous example of a state which collapsed by its over-emphasis on the single nationality which predominates in Germany. It was this over-emphasis which lent itself to the designs of a sinister Pan-Germanic policy and which, in turn, by its chauvinistic implication led to the ambition to

force "Deutschtum" on the rest of the world. Over-emphasis on nationality is largely responsible also, as we have seen,¹ for the outbreak of the anti-Semitic movement. "Deutschland über Alles"! — the correct translation of which phrase as placing everything German in the minds of Germans far above anything else is quite as objectionable as the ordinary misinterpretation of it as though it meant to imply the domination of Germany over everything. "Deutschland über Alles" ought to be nothing more than "My Country 'Tis of Thee," but it involves by its insinuating phraseology precisely that over-emphasis on nationality which led to the position reached by Treitschke and his followers, that the German nation must remain free from the taint of anything that was not "Deutsch," that the nation must remain a single nationality with no foreign admixture. The Poles must, therefore, be forcibly Germanized. Everything Gallic must be driven out of Alsace-Lorraine, and since according to this conception of "Deutschtum," the Jews cannot belong to the German nationality, they must be kept from participation in the political and public life for fear that their influence might endanger the purity of the German nationalistic ideal. Had that

¹ Page 64.

“ideal” been less pure, it might have prevented Germany from violating her treaty obligations to Belgium and from such barbarisms as the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Now what is the application of all this to the status of the Jews? Obviously that, in the first place, the Jews *may* be a nationality without for that reason being necessarily destined or impelled to form a nation. They might, assuming that they would care to be united as a single group or could be so united, form a nationality as part of some nation itself composed of other nationalities. Applying this to the situation in Palestine, the population of which consists at present of various nationalities and indeed, as we shall see, of representatives of a surprisingly large number of such nationalities, the obvious form that the reconstruction of Palestine after the war should take on is the creation of a Palestinian State based on *all* the nationalities there congregated, and not a Jewish State which, if it means anything at all, would place the emphasis on a state formed of a *single* nationality. As for the large bulk of Jews who will always live outside of Palestine, for the sufficient reason that Palestine will not hold more than one-tenth of the fifteen million Jews in the world,—granting again that the

Jews would wish to regard themselves as a separate nationality,— they should naturally form an element in making up the national entity in *each* of the countries throughout which they are scattered. The Jews actually fulfill this function at present in Western European lands, as in this country and elsewhere where states are organized on the basis of democracy, with the recognition of the equal rights of citizenship for all the inhabitants. The logic of the situation, therefore, suggests that the remaining tenth of Jews who, for one reason or the other, will desire to settle in Palestine, should likewise be one nationality among the many at present represented in Palestine, forming with the others a single political *entity* which would constitute the Palestinian nation.

Moreover, the circumstance that the Jews *once* formed a separate nation in a state organized, as all states of antiquity were, on the basis of a single nationality until the days of the Roman Empire, is no reason why they should again do so, even if this were possible or desirable. But are the Jews at present even a nationality, on the ground that they once were one 2000 years ago? In any political sense of the word, certainly not, for apart from the fact that a nationality without any *specific* country

to which it belongs and without a common language is an abnormality amounting almost to a contradiction of terms, there is no unity among Jews except that represented by the bond of a common religion and of a common tradition, the common tradition remaining even in the case of those who no longer are Jews in a religious sense.

Beyond this common tradition the Western Jew has scarcely anything that binds him to the Jew of Eastern lands. He feels no nearer to him than he does to other non-Jewish Easterners. Even among the Jews of Western Europe it is well known that the German Jew, for example, is not particularly attracted to his Polish brethren and not infrequently shows his repugnance towards them. The common impression that Jews everywhere feel particularly bound to one another is entirely erroneous.¹

To be sure — and this must be freely admitted — the fact that the Jews are scattered throughout the world would not be a decisive factor in determining that they are not a nationality, for Germans, Ital-

¹ See further on this subject Felix Adler's address on "Nationalism and Zionism," p. 6, in which he points out the results that would follow any attempt to bring together Jews from various parts of the world, who are not congenial to one another.

ians, Greeks and English are likewise found in many parts of the world, but when, however, in addition to this we also find that there is no *particular* country which, since the loss of Palestine, may be regarded as the homeland of the Jews, then their dispersion throughout the world does become a deciding factor in answering the question whether the Jews are at present a nationality in the negative. The situation may, therefore, be summed up as follows: The Jews ceased to be a *nation* with the complete eclipse of the last semblance of their national independence;¹ and they ceased to be a *nationality* when the movement of emigration from Palestine (which began as far back as the conquest of the country by Nebuchadnezzar at the close of the sixth century before this era) had, by the fifth century of our era, left only a small and ever-decreasing minority in what was once the Jewish homeland. Egypt, Rome, Morocco, Spain, the Crimea, Germany, Holland, Poland, Russia became in turn the real centers for the Jews, insofar as we can speak of any center for a dispersed people. At the present time there are at least five such centers, Russia, Poland, Germany, England and the United States. Therefore,

¹ In the year 135 A. D. See above, p. 32.

even if Palestine should in the future become a center, it would be only one of many centers, and not *the* center.

But, it may be objected, is not the circumstance that Judaism, though it marked theoretically the cutting loose of religion from nationality and laid the emphasis on religion as the affair of the individual and not of the group, *because* it remained confined to a single group and continued to present a double aspect to such an extent that the hope for a national restoration of the people became part and parcel of the religion and remains to this day a doctrine of orthodox Judaism — is not this circumstance a justification for regarding the Jews as a nationality at least, if not as a nation — a nationality, if you choose, temporarily deprived of its independence? Hardly. For, as pointed out, the political restoration is entirely secondary in orthodox Judaism to the religious aspect of such an event. The latter has always held the larger place. The political restoration in the orthodox doctrine is purely incidental to the restoration of the Jews as a religious body who will be permitted, when God so wills, again to dwell in the old homeland, not for the purpose of enjoying national independence but in order to restore the Temple cult. The Temple,

not the State, forms the center of this belief in a restoration, precisely as the Messianic promise is essentially a religious doctrine and only to a minor degree, like a tail to a kite, a political one. At no time in the history of the Jews since their dispersion throughout the world has there been any combination in the name of the religion for a *political* restoration, though there have been movements of a purely religious character led by those who laid claim to being the Messiah and who as part of that claim were to lead the people back to Palestine.¹

Now, in view of all this, it is manifestly misleading to hold up Zionism in its modern political aspect as the manifestation of the reassertion of the nationalistic feeling or spirit among the Jews. It is a surface view to regard Zionism, as is done by most of the political Zionists, as part of the general movement of the rise of nationalities which is a distinguishing trait in the political history of the nineteenth century, which led to the resuscitation of the Balkan nationalities, which prompted the union of Italy and found another expression in the formation of the united German Empire in 1871, and which is

¹ See the account of such a movement in the eighteenth century in Graetz, *History of the Jews*, Volume 5, pp. 272-290.

manifesting itself at the end of the war in the efforts of Polish, Bohemian and Magyar nationalities for a renewal of their national independence. These movements furnish no analogy for Zionism. None of the nationalities here involved had ever ceased to be one. They had remained nationalities, despite some emigration from their native lands. The movement for political union and political independence followed in the case of all the nationalities above named upon the removal of pressure exerted by a foreign domination in some form or the other. That pressure had kept the nationalities in question from asserting themselves. The Balkan nations always remained *in* the Balkan States, and fought for their independence in lands which they had never given up. German and Italian unity was accomplished as soon as it became feasible through change of political circumstances, for groups artificially separated from one another to coalesce. The union represented the normal condition following the breaking up into little groups; the separation an abnormal state of affairs brought about through conquest or through internal difficulties. It is only necessary to study the conditions under which the movement for the reassertion of the principle of nationality in Europe during the nineteenth century

unfolded itself to recognize that Zionism is a movement of a totally different character.

Zionism did not arise through the removal of pressure on a suppressed nationality, but starts as an ameliorative measure *because* of that pressure. It is a movement on the part of people who, because of the hopeless outlook for improving their condition in the country in which they dwelt, sought an opportunity to lead a new life under freer development elsewhere. / Zionism does not arise in Palestine, but outside of it. It moves towards Palestine under the influence of a romantic sentiment. / It is not a movement arousing the Jews in all parts of the world, except insofar as Jews sympathize with their suffering fellows. For similar reasons the analogy between political Zionism and the efforts of the Irish to secure their political independence falls to the ground. The Irish never ceased to be a nationality in the land in which they remained after coming under British rule. Ireland remained distinctively Irish, despite large emigrations through economic pressure to the United States and Canada. But Palestine ceased to be Jewish a few centuries after the extinction of the national life of the Jews. It is to-day predominately Arabic, and next to Mohammedans, Christians from all parts of the world

are more numerous in Palestine than Jews, indeed about twice as numerous. Similarly the rise of the Armenians and of the Arabs of Arabia during the war to assert their right to self-determination are movements among those living in their own lands.

It was natural that both in Russia, where the Zionist movement arose, and in Germany and Austria, where it gained strength through the reaction upon Jews of the social prejudice aroused against them, the movement should attach itself to the Zionistic sentiment. The political Zionists are the victims of a curious self-deception in interpreting this sentiment as due to a nationalistic feeling. The sentiment is due, in the case of the orthodox among the Zionists — and they form, as we have seen, a very small group — because of their belief in the doctrine of the restoration as primarily a religious hope; and in the case of those who have abandoned orthodox Judaism the sentiment is to be explained as the survival of the influence exerted by the doctrine for so many centuries. It would be strange if it were otherwise, for it is of the nature of sentiment to survive long after the basis upon which it rests has passed away. Tradition continues to exert its force long after the belief upon which it rests has been dispelled. Ceremonies and rites continue to be

practiced for centuries after the reasons underlying them are no longer accepted or even understood. And it is well from many points of view that this should be the case, for without tradition and without the influence of sentiment, life would be deprived of some of its finest aspirations and much of that romantic coloring, which we need to counteract the deadening influence of the everyday prosaic and monotonous succession of the same experiences — the endless cycle of everlasting repetition which that amiable cynic, Koheleth, justly recognizes as the source of *ennui*, of becoming tired of life itself.¹

We must differentiate therefore in an analysis of Zionism between the conditions that called it forth, and the direction that it took under the influence of the one root for a political Zionistic movement that survived after the two others had lost their *raison d'être*. That sentiment is expressed by the Psalmist of old

“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning.”

There can be no question of the strength and genuineness of that sentiment among many who have in

¹ Ecclesiastes, Chap. I. See Jastrow, *A Gentle Cynic*, p. 122.

recent years given their adherence to the movement. Indeed, ever since the rise of the Russian societies of the "Lovers of Zion," when the trend towards establishing colonies in Palestine as an escape for Russian Jews set in, the romantic sentiment towards Palestine has steadily gained in strength. Naturally so, for it makes its appeal to every one who is capable of feeling the attachment to a historic and significant past, irrespective of his attitude towards Judaism viewed as a religion. "There is a sense," says George Eliot in one of her essays,¹ "in which the worthy child of a nation that has brought forth illustrious prophets, high and unique among the poets of the world, is bound by their visions." The Zionist sentiment would therefore become a very natural bond uniting those who feel that they have something in common with fellow Jews. It is not too much to say that one can only escape from this feeling by a deliberate attempt to suppress it, but neither the feeling nor the sentiment for Palestine is due to any national consciousness. The test may be made by any Jew who feels himself to be a thorough American or a thorough Englishman or Frenchman. He cannot feel any bond of nation-

¹ "The Modern Hep, Hep," in the *Impressions of Theophrastus Such*.

ality attaching him, let us say, to the Jews of Morocco or of Yemen, who will appear as strange to him as they would to any other Westerner coming in contact with groups that have remained thoroughly Oriental in character and with points of view and customs that remind one of the remote past rather than of the living present. Only those who have no country or who do not feel *strongly* attached to the one in which they happen to dwell, can possibly have a genuine nationalistic stirring at the thought of Palestine. The fallacy of political Zionism thus rests on a whole series of false interpretations and false analogies: a false interpretation of the original desire of Russian Jews to secure what Pinsker called "self-emancipation," and which was merely an endeavor to seek a new life with opportunities for free development; a false interpretation of the reaction of anti-Semitism on those who no longer were religious Jews; a false interpretation of Jewish self-consciousness; a false analogy between the present status of the Jews and that of genuine nationalities seeking political independence; a false analogy between the factor of tradition and that of race; a false analogy between the position of Jews over 2000 years ago as a political unit and their present status as a people bound by a common

religion and by common tradition, with the tradition surviving among those who have ceased to feel the religious bond. The romantic sentiment for Palestine is natural and worthy, provided it does not pass beyond the point proper to it — that is, provided it *remains* a sentiment. When it transgresses that bound it leads to Jewish self-consciousness, which, while likewise an intelligible reaction against social prejudice, is apt to mislead one into the error of mistaking the reaction for the stirrings of a dormant national feeling. Political Zionism also involves a false reading of the trend of Jewish history during the past 2000 years. It is to this aspect of the question that we must next turn, and it will be my effort to show that it is because when the Jews ceased to be a nation they became something *more*, that they survived.

VI

THE TREND OF JEWISH HISTORY

ATTENTION has already been called to the important fact that the prophets, who inaugurated the movement which culminated in Judaism, appeared at a time when the national life of the Jews in Palestine was approaching its eclipse. The new conception of religion which they brought forward was not an outcome of Jewish nationalism, but rather a protest against it, in so far as the new conception broke with the old one, which assumed that a deity was particularly concerned with one group, and that a people could not survive after rejection by their national protector. The conception of a God of universal sway which was the logical conclusion from the position of the prophets, though not definitely reached till the post-exilic period, was inconsistent with the doctrine on which religion among the ancient Hebrews, as in antiquity in general, rested, whereby the jurisdiction of a deity was geographically circumscribed by the territory which

a people controlled. Even more significant as an indication of the profound break with a past entirely wrapped up in the *national* life of a people, is the circumstance that the contributions made by the Jews to the world came, not when the national life was at its height, but after it had ceased practically to exist, even though the aspirations and the hope for renewal of political independence continued.

We have seen that when the Jews were permitted to return from the Babylonian exile at the end of the sixth century and received a measure of local autonomy under Persian control, they were no longer a purely political unit, but essentially a religious group. The impelling factor that dominated their lives after the Babylonian exile was the opportunity afforded by the return to restore the Temple in Jerusalem with its service. Yahweh's sanctuary served as their rallying point. The study of His Law as embodied in a series of codes, enclosed in a framework of tradition, became the chief expression of the people's highest ambitions. The national life and the national hope were tacked on to the religious mission of which the people became more and more conscious. Bound, however, as every people is by the weight of tradition, the Jews could not entirely divorce their religion from their nationality, and

only the choicest spirits among them recognized the direction in which they were drifting as a group. For all practical purposes the religious bond became more and more the sole tie uniting the people, with national consciousness tacked on as a survival of the past. Even when this national feeling flares up under the pressure of a political crisis, it is as much due to a religious impulse as to a political one. The Maccabean uprising in the year 166 B. C. is proof in point. It was essentially a religious rebellion, an effort to prevent the religion from being lost by the attempt of the Greeks to crush it. The pollution of the holy sanctuary through a policy of Hellenization which was to be extended to the cult aroused Judas Maccabeus and his followers to a supreme effort; and it was only because religious freedom could not be obtained without also throwing off the political yoke of the Greek governors that the uprising assumed a political character, a genuine uprising to preserve the right of the people for self-determination of its destinies, religious and political.

The process which changed the Jews from a mere nation to something more than a nation reached its climax when the final struggle with the Roman power ensued and which ended in 135 A. D. in the complete national eclipse. The Jews split into two

groups, those who followed the teachings of the Apostles and proceeded to gain the world for the new religion; and those who remained a separate group, becoming more and more isolated from the world about them by assuming the rôle of a religious band, who combined with the aspirations of the ancient Prophets an unyielding attachment to a mass of rites and ceremonies that had grown up in the course of many centuries and which had become Traditional or, as it is sometimes called, Talmudic Judaism. Had the Jews remained merely a nation they would have disappeared upon the downfall of their distinct national life, precisely as so many other nations of antiquity disappeared upon the extinction of their national vitality, as the Egyptians, Babylonians, Phœnicians, Moabites, Philistines, the Persians, the Hittites and many others disappeared. The Jews survived because they had ceased to be a mere nation for several centuries before the actual extinction of the feeble flame of nationality; they survive to-day because of the strong bond that was created among them through their becoming a religious people. Declining to make any concessions in their religion to include others than Jews, Judaism presented the aspect of a religion universal in its implications but restricted

in its scope, as against Christianity which opened its doors to all peoples and threw down all nationalistic barriers to the acceptance of the new faith.

In accord with the fact that Judaism is not an outcome of Jewish nationalism but reaches its definite constitution after the national life had almost run its course, we find the great contributions of the Jews to the world all made, not as a result of their national activity, but through the stimulus exerted by their religion as it shaped itself after the rise of the prophets.¹ The spirit prevailing in the Pentateuch is that of the Prophets, not that of the earlier nationalists. The traditions of the past and the entire history of the people are viewed in the historical books of the Old Testament likewise from the standpoint of the religion of the Prophets. They receive their final form as the expression of post-exilic Judaism. The great master-pieces of Old Testament literature — the Psalms, Job and Ecclesiastes — all of them of post-exilic origin, are the product of the new note struck by the Prophets, which entirely altered the attitude of the people towards life, and ultimately changed the status of the Jews from a nation to that of “the people of the

¹ See further on this point, Jastrow, *A Gentle Cynic*, p. 56 *et seq.*

book," as Mohammed calls them — a people kept together by a spiritual bond that far transcended in significance and in its results the former political union. If in the Psalms the national note is not infrequently struck, it is as an accompaniment to the religious melody which dominates. The Zionistic longing which like a plaint runs through the ages,

“ If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,”

is primarily religious, not nationalistic. The Psalmist thinks of Jerusalem as the Holy City — not of the national center and the political capitol.

In a further illustration that the destiny of the Jews — so far as that destiny can be read in their history — was to unfold their real strength *after* the national life had ebbed away, we may point to the fact that as a nation in Palestine they made no important contribution to civilization, but only after they ceased to be a nation and scattered outside of Palestine. Politically, Palestine never played any notable part either in antiquity or in later days. Its geographical position as the bridge between Asia and Africa, singled it out in early days as a buffer state between the Empire of the Nile and the one which arose in the Euphrates Valley. It also acted

often as a bulwark against the advance of hordes from the North — and at times the bulwark was stormed. Palestine has no river that can serve as an avenue of commerce. It is cut up by mountain ranges and valleys which split up the population into separate groups. Even the Jews themselves could not maintain their unity in such a land and soon divided into a northern and a southern Kingdom.

As long as the Hebrews enjoyed national independence they made no contributions in the field of art, or in science, in methods of government or in military strategy. When Solomon planned to build the Temple he had to send to Phœnicia for architects and builders. There did not rise in Palestine any specific Jewish architecture. The Temple was patterned after the religious structures of Phœnicia and Babylonia. In literature, as has just been pointed out, the Hebrews made no original contributions of any moment until after the creation of the new type of religion which, be it noted once more, made its appearance as the national life was passing away. But note the profound difference in the intellectual activity of the Jews *after* their dispersion throughout the Western world. In Alexandria, under the stimulus of close contact with Greek thought and Greek culture, the Jewish settlement, which can be

traced back to a few centuries before our era, created an original school of speculative thought. The Jews of Egypt became world traders, and as they passed into one European country after the other they reacted on the impulse exerted by the new conditions of life. Until restrictions to their natural energies were put upon them, chiefly during the Middle Ages, they constituted an important element in the population, contributing to the science, art and commerce of their surroundings. While in Palestine, leading a purely national existence, the Jews produced no great philosophers, but after their dispersion throughout Western Europe a Maimonides and Ibn Gebirol arose in Spain, a Spinoza in Holland, and in our days Bergson in France. More particularly since their political emancipation in Western Europe which enabled them to enter fully into the intellectual life about them, have the Jews produced an amazingly large array of eminent men — and also some eminent women — in all fields. We do not learn of any great musicians among the Hebrews of ancient Palestine, but in Germany they produce a Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and a Meyerbeer, in Russia Rubinstein, and in Austria Goldmark — to name only the most eminent among a host of distinguished names. One scans the pages

of the Old Testament in vain for great political leaders, with the exception of Moses of whom much that is told is legendary, and of David of whom much that is told is not edifying; but within an astonishingly short time after their political emancipation they produced a Beaconsfield in England, Lasker and Bamberger in Germany, and a Sonnino in Italy. In all European countries as well as in this country we have a long list of eminent scientists, historians, physicians, mathematicians, philologists, economists, who are Jews or of Jewish origin.

Outside of the literary inspiration afforded by the religious movement, the Jews while in Palestine produced no great literati, but in Germany we have Heine, in England Zangwill, in Denmark Brandes, and in Austria Schnitzler — all of the highest quality. It is hardly necessary to do more than refer to the large part played by Jews throughout the world in commerce and finance, and this prominence is all the more noteworthy because in Palestine they were an agricultural people and eschewed commerce. The dispersion changed their mode of life as well as their outlook upon it, so that their contributions towards commercial activity in the Western world are a direct result of their ceasing to be a nation, devoted to agricultural pursuits.

But, say the Zionists, these contributions are not credited to the Jewish people but to the lands in which those who distinguish themselves happen to dwell. In Palestine alone can men be produced who will be recognized as being great in their capacity as Jews. I confess that I have little patience with such a chauvinistic sentiment which places race pride above the actual achievement. What difference does it make whether the contributions of the Jews are entered in a ledger as due to them or not, so long as the world receives the benefit? Secondly, it is admitted on all sides that the Jewish type of mind, so far as it can express itself, is to be detected in the songs of Heine, in the compositions of Meyerbeer and in the novels of Zangwill, as it also shows itself in the philosophy of Spinoza and in the critical acumen of Brandes. As for such fields as history, archæology, philology and the natural sciences, surely no one supposes that there is such a thing as "Jewish" mathematics or "Jewish" chemistry. It is always somewhat chauvinistic and a little vulgar to boast of a great man because he is a Jew, but it is certainly still worse to regret that he was not born in Palestine and that his contributions to science or literature or music were not made as a member of a Jewish State. The only index that

we have of judging of the destiny of a people is by its past, and the history of the Jews during the past 2000 years points unmistakably to their function of commingling with their fellow men and thus rendering their share of service towards the advancement of culture and civilization. To those who read history aright it must be clear that it is the function of the Jews to enter into the life about them, to give also, as the recent war has shown, their full share of patriotic service when their country demands it.

Now, instead of drawing the obvious lesson from the trend of Jewish history, the political Zionists propose to make the attempt to turn the hands of time backward some 2000 years in order to set up as an ideal the re-recognition of the Jews as a separate political entity, and this at a time when a new era of liberalism appears to be dawning which there is reason to hope and believe will bring to the Jews of Russia, Roumania and Poland relief from their present pitiable condition through a recognition of their full rights of citizenship in these lands. Such a recognition would alone furnish a solution of the so-called Jewish Question in accord with the spirit of the age. Not only the Jews but the world ought to be *unwilling* to accept any other solution. It seems strange indeed to find the Zionists engaged

in exerting every nerve to take a step backward, while the whole world seems bent on moving forward. It seems still stranger that Zionists should grow enthusiastic over the prospect of establishing a Jewish State in a land which can only hold one-tenth of the entire number of Jews in the world. It seems strangest of all that they should favor a state which necessarily involves a recognition of some bond between religion and nationality and sets up again the older conception of a nation formed by a single nationality, whereas the history of Palestine itself during the past 2000 years points unmistakably to its reorganization according to the modern democratic view of the State, based on a national unit formed by peoples irrespective of descent or ethnic qualities. What is needed is a Palestinian State in which all who agree to adhere to the principles on which the country of their birth or adoption is to be organized shall have an equal share. The fallacy of political Zionism is strikingly revealed by a consideration of Palestine of To-day, to which we next turn.

VII

PALESTINE OF TO-DAY

THE changes that have come over Palestine itself since it ceased to be a national center for the Jewish people constitute another potent objection to the aim of the political Zionist to reconstitute that historic corner of the globe as a Jewish State.

From having once been the "Promised Land" for one nationality, Palestine has become a land of promise for many peoples, a great gathering place of nationalities from all parts of the world. It contains at present a mixed population out of all proportion to its limited territory of some 10,000 square miles.¹ It is no exaggeration to say that the changes in Palestine during the past two millenniums have been as decisive in their character as those that have taken place in the Western Continent since its discovery some 400 years ago. A totally different Palestine has arisen in the place of the old

¹ It is somewhat larger than the State of Vermont and somewhat smaller than the State of Maryland. It would stretch on the Hudson from New York to Albany, and eastwards to an extent varying from twenty to forty miles,

one which the Jews through force of circumstances were obliged to abandon. As a land now filled with sacred associations for the followers of three great religions, it cannot be said to belong to any particular group, as is maintained by the political Zionists. It has become as sacred to Christians and Mohammedans as to Jews. Palestine is the birth-place of Christianity as well as of Judaism, and that single momentous fact compels the historian to regard it in a different light from what it was before Christianity. While not the birth-place of Islam, Mohammed yet drew his inspiration from the religions that arose in Palestine. The only miracle recorded in Mohammed's life was the mysterious night ride to Jerusalem to confirm his mission as the Messenger of Allah. Mohammed claimed to be a successor of a line of Prophets stretching from Abraham to Jesus. He called himself the "seal" of these messengers of God. He fixed upon Jerusalem as the spiritual center of the religion he had founded. The prayers of the faithful were to be directed towards Jerusalem, as the Jews and the early Christians orientated themselves towards that center in their religious worship. It was only when both Jews and Christians declined the invitation of Mohammed to recognize him as a Prophet that he

changed the *kibleh* — that is, the direction of prayer — from Jerusalem to his own birth-place, Mecca. Despite this change, Jerusalem became as sacred to Mohammedans as Mecca, aye, in some respects more so, for there is nothing in Mecca to remind the Mohammedan pilgrim of the Prophet, except the fact that he was born there. The pilgrimage to Mecca was not instituted by Mohammed but was an old Arab institution which Mohammed, bound by the traditions of the past, observed and which on that account became an obligation upon all his followers. In Jerusalem, in the cave under the sacred rock around which the chief mosque is built the mark of Mohammed's head is shown. Day and night Mohammedans may be found in this cave seeking by prayer to Allah to obtain the merit that attaches to the sanctity of this spot. The rock represents the site of Solomon's Temple, but its sacred character antedates even the coming of the Hebrews by an indefinite number of centuries. The rock itself is a survival of primitive stone worship, and Solomon chose this site for his Temple because the Jebusites, from whom David conquered Jerusalem (c. 1000 B. C.), had brought their sacrifices to this rock, which was an ancient altar.¹

¹ See Barton, *Archæology of the Bible*, p. 168.

The sanctity of Jerusalem thus reverts to a period far beyond the rise of the oldest of the three religions whose associations are entwined around the place. It carries us back to the primitive Semites for whom Jerusalem was a stronghold centuries before the federation of the Hebrew seminomadic tribes was organized. Outside of Jerusalem, the whole of Palestine is as sacred for Christians as it is for Jews. Bethlehem, Nazareth, Tiberias and the Jordan are associated with events or legends in the life of the founder, and Christians, Mohammedans and Jews alike revere the sites which are associated with such figures of the Old Testament as Abraham, Jacob, Joseph, Rachael, David, Solomon, Absalom, Job and the Prophets. Mohammedans and Christians have fought for possession of the land. One of the first goals of the Arabic forces gathered by the successors of Mohammed was the conquest of Palestine, which took place in 636 A. D. only a few years after the death of the Prophet at Medina (632 B. C.). For two centuries, from the tenth to the twelfth, armies crusaded from all parts of Europe to wrest Palestine from the hands of the Mohammedans. No fiercer wars, intensified as they were by a religious background, were ever waged than those for the possession of

Jerusalem during these two centuries. The struggle ended in the triumph of the Crescent over the Cross, but the soldiers of the Cross kept in their hearts the longing of the ancient Zionist,

“ If I forget thee, O Jerusalem.”

The Mohammedan conquerors in time made concessions to their vanquished rivals, and permitted them to retain possession of the sites most sacred to Christianity, more particularly the traditional birth-place and the tomb of the founder. Around these places as well as in other spots associated with the life of Jesus, churches and chapels have been erected which constitute the most sacred monuments of Christianity. The visitor at Jerusalem is profoundly impressed by this pathetic three-fold attachment to Jerusalem on the part of the followers of three religions who, despite the bitterness in their hearts towards one another, meet in Jerusalem, drawn thither because of recollections that they have in common. If one would visualize what Jerusalem means to Jews, Christians and Mohammedans, one must pass from the Mosque around the rock to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and thence to the wall remaining from the Temple in the days of Herod at which pious Jews wail daily for the loss

of Jerusalem. The scenes that one witnesses at these three spots epitomize the history of Palestine as a sacred land. They illustrate what the country means to all who feel the touch of the past, whose faith dominates their lives and with whom the sentiment of Zion remains a living force.

The same impulse which has at all times acted as a magnet in drawing pious Jews to Palestine,¹ there to spend their lives in study and devotion and to be buried on holy soil, has also drawn Christians from all parts of the world who wish to live near the scenes of the Gospel stories and who feel that only in the land of the Christ can they lead rounded-out Christian lives. Bethlehem and Nazareth are largely Christian settlements, Nazareth almost entirely so. In Jerusalem the Eastern and Western branches of the Church are represented by large establishments. The hold that Eastern Christianity has upon Jerusalem is particularly striking. The Russian or Greek church is if anything more largely represented than the Roman Catholic or Protestant, and thousands of Russians, chiefly of the peasant class, come yearly to Jerusalem, many of them

¹ See Zangwill's charming and pathetic story, "To Die in Jerusalem," in his volume *They that Walk in Darkness*, as an illustration of the strength of this magnet.

wandering on foot for long stretches to assure their eternal salvation by immersion in the sacred waters of the Jordan. Christian pilgrims from France, Spain, Italy and other countries are constantly passing up and down through the land.

There is scarcely a European country that is not represented in the permanent Christian population of Palestine. Among the circa 150,000 Christians, we find Russians, English, French, Germans, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks, Italians, Dutch, Swedes, Swiss, Poles, Bohemians, Abyssinians, and so on. There is an American colony in Jerusalem which was founded by a Chicago woman some sixty years ago, and to-day the children of the third generation feel strongly the attachment to the soil. Similarly, in the Mohammedan population of Palestine, about 500,000, all sections of the Islamic world, Egypt, Arabia, Asia Minor, Persia, Turkey, are represented. The predominating Arabic speaking population are the direct descendants of those who have been in possession of the soil for many, many centuries. If, therefore, there is such a thing as an historical claim to the land, the claim of the Mohammedan natives of Palestine rests on as substantial a basis as that of either Jews or Christians, as Professor George Adam Smith, the most distinguished

authority on Palestine past and present, points out.¹ The Jewish population, while steadily increasing through the growth of the Zionist colonies in Palestine and other new-comers (chiefly to Jerusalem), is the smallest of all, estimated at about 80,000.

It is evident that this position which Palestine has acquired must form the point of departure for the reorganization of the country, now that the pressure of Turkish rule, or rather misrule, has been removed. If the trend of the history of the Jews during the past two millenniums points to their working out their destinies in the lands through which they are scattered, the changes which have come over Palestine during this same period point with equal clearness to the organization of a State based on a mixture of nationalities and certainly not on a *single* nationality as the controlling element. Palestine has become what some of the ancient Hebrew Prophets envisaged

“ And peoples shall flow unto it,
 And many nations shall go and say:
 Come, let us go up to the mountain of Yahweh.”²

The dream has not been fulfilled in the manner that the Prophet had in mind, but yet in a spiritual and

¹ *Syria and the Holy Land*, p. 56.

² Micah 4, 2, and Isaiah 2, 2.

in its highest sense, it is true that, as he goes on to say,

“ Out of Zion shall go forth the law,
And the word of Yahweh from Jerusalem,”

for Western and Eastern civilizations alike have received their inspiration from the teachings of the Prophets and of Jesus and the Apostles. Palestine has become an intra-national possession. To set up in the face of so momentous a fact the claim of a single group, because they held the land for some centuries by virtue of forcible conquest some 3000 years ago, is not only to ignore the equally important fact that this group lost it again through reconquest by others, but that the associations which have since grown up around the country are of such a character as to set aside any claims based on a supposed poetical or historical justice. Such a claim cannot be defined otherwise than as a misdirected sentimental appeal, which can only serve to illustrate the mischief that must result when an attempt is made to convert a fine sentiment into a political movement. Fanaticism will generally be found to be the outcome of a misdirected sentimental appeal, and we may expect to see the flames of fanaticism burst forth from all sides, if the attempt is made now

or at any future time to make Palestine officially a Jewish State.

Those who have visited the country will testify to the strong feelings of mutual animosity among the three classes of inhabitants, which the Turkish government did little or nothing to moderate. It is idle to close our eyes to this fact, so obvious to the traveller in Palestine, and yet in the discussions of Zionism this aspect of the situation is rarely touched upon. I wish to emphasize it here as one of the most serious objections to the practical execution of the aims of the political Zionists, and that the existence of this animosity, extending even to bitter rivalry among Christian sects, suggests a totally different solution for the reorganization of Palestine under the new conditions created by its having been wrested out of the hands of the Turks. The world is weary of strife and bitter rivalries and hostilities that eat at the vitals of our civilization. What will have been gained by the victory over Germany, if in the settlement of the problems that confront the world, we introduce a factor that will lead to further strife, that will accentuate hostilities instead of soothing them, that will keep the world in an insecure state instead of advancing at least some degrees in the direction of the establishment of bet-

ter feelings among mankind, on which basis alone an enduring peace can be hoped for?

Voices in protest have already been raised by Mohammedans and Christians in Palestine and Syria against the aims of the Zionists to usurp, as they regard it, the control of Palestine. According to reliable reports a delegation of Mohammedans from Palestine came to England about a year ago to lay their protest before the English government. The Syrian National Society has published a pamphlet, "Syria for the Syrians," a section of which is devoted to the Zionist danger.¹ These protests may be regarded as symptoms of the genuine storm that may be expected if the possibility of carrying out the political aims of the Zionists should come within the range of realization.

I wish, however, to put the objection to political Zionism on higher grounds than mere expediency, or even on higher grounds than the fear of the results that will follow upon a step that would serve to check the growth of more amicable relations among the adherents of different faiths in the Holy Land. The aim to recognize Palestine as a Jewish

¹ H. L. Katibah, *Syria for the Syrians* (Syrian National Bulletin, Volume I, No. 9, February 28, 1919).

See also the excellent article of Herbert Adams Gibbons in the *Century Magazine* for January, 1919.

State runs counter to the trend of Palestinian history, which points distinctly to its reorganization on the modern democratic basis of government which replaces the older idea of a nation based on a single nationality, by a larger conception of a national unit formed of various nationalities. The presence of so many nationalities in Palestine of to-day is the all-sufficient argument in favor of creating a Palestinian State — not a Jewish State any more than a Mohammedan or a Christian State, or an Anglo-Saxon or a Gallic or Teutonic State. A Jewish State, no matter on how broad a basis it may be constituted, *necessarily* involves the older conception of a nation based on a single nationality. Where conditions exist which suggest such a political form, a single nationality forms the natural point of departure, though, as we have seen, even there, it encounters difficulties in the present age of close intercommunication and constant shiftings of population, which are forcing such States to a recognition of the larger principle of a national unit, not limited to a single nationality. But where as in Palestine the conditions definitely *preclude* a State of a single nationality, except by the forcible submission of other nationalities already represented, it is an injustice to give the preference to any single group even if

such a group should constitute the majority. Now since a Jewish State is devoid of any meaning unless it means the acceptance of the idea for Palestine of the domination by a single nationality, it follows that even if the rest of the population be accorded equal political rights, a Jewish State without such domination would mean nothing at all, would be an empty sound, a formal acknowledgment of a purely academic character to satisfy a clannish sense of pride.

Any one can become a Palestinian, as any person can become an American or an Englishman, by obtaining nationalization papers and swearing allegiance to the principles of the country, but no one can become a Jew except by a profession or an adherence to a certain faith. Even the most ardent political Zionists will not deny this contention, and since the Zionists also claim that Zionism is not a religious movement, they surely do not contemplate making converts to Judaism in the proposed Jewish State. How, then, is it possible to organize a State in this democratic age, which by its name sets up a barrier to citizenship that can only be overcome by a religious test? A Jewish State, by a logic which we cannot escape, necessarily limits citizenship in the *full* sense to a definitely prescribed group, precisely

as in ancient Greece only a Greek by birth or by affiliation through marriage with a Greek could be a Greek citizen, and as in the mediæval Christian States of Europe only one who professed Christianity could have all the rights of citizenship. Even marriage with a Jewess does not make one a Jew, any more than marriage with a Jew makes the woman a Jewess. A Jewish State under the most liberal possible government sets up this barrier, whether we express it in terms of religion or of nationality. As a writer has pithily put it, "if it be Jewish, it cannot be a State; if it be a State it cannot be Jewish."¹

Reference is sometimes made in the discussion of this dilemma to the liberal spirit of the Priestly Code, as a proof that a Jewish State is historically bound to be organized on a broad policy. The Code says explicitly that there shall be "one law for the stranger and the native."² That principle involves a notable advance over conditions prevailing generally in antiquity, and we should respect this broad outlook of the Code,³ as due to the new religious

¹ Israel Abrahams, "Palestine and Jewish Nationality," in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1918, p. 458.

² Exodus 12, 49; also Numbers 9, 14 in a slightly variant wording.

³ The two passages form part of the Priestly Code which was promulgated in the post-exilic period.

spirit introduced by the Prophets. But note that the Code still divides the citizens into two classes, the native and the *ger*, as the technical term reads, and which means originally a "sojourner." Once a *ger* always a *ger* is still the principle underlying the Code. The *ger* can only become a native, even according to the Priestly Code, by accepting the religious faith of the native. The Code merely says — though this is a great deal — that the *ger* shall be on a par with the native *before the law*; but it does not state that he is to be a fullfledged citizen with all the rights and privileges of a native. It *could* not say that without upsetting the foundation on which a Jewish theocratic commonwealth, as set forth in the Biblical codes, rests. The natives *must* be Jews, and neither the children nor the grandchildren of the *ger* nor the great-grandchildren can become natives, any more than he can become a native. There is a limit beyond which even so liberal a Code as the Priestly compilation could not go without breaking the bond between religion, nationality and citizenship which is implied throughout.

Zionists will, therefore, find it to be of little avail to give the assurance that the rights and privileges of the Mohammedan and Christian inhabitants of Palestine would not be interfered with. The pro-

test is against the *principle* involved in placing the control of a country in the hands of any particular group. The recent war was waged to establish the principle that a country belongs to all of the population who live in it. The Jews who have suffered most from the undemocratic regulation of governments in former ages, and who still suffer in those countries in which democracy has not yet secured a definite foothold, would cut a sorry figure indeed at the present juncture in the world's affairs if they, the first champions of religious liberty, should appear in advocacy of a plan which is based upon the old principle of organizing a State on the basis of the accidental factor of birth or creed, or what is even worse on both factors. Instead of welding the various ethnic elements of Palestine into a political whole, under the conditions which would be created by a Jewish State, the policy would necessarily result in keeping the various elements separate from one another; and that is contrary to the democratic spirit of popular government.

It is not to the point to argue, in reply to this, as political Zionists do, that the Jewish State actually proposes to extend the full rights of citizenship to all, irrespective of creed, race, descent or even sex. They point with satisfaction to the first plank in the

Zionistic platform adopted by the American Zionists in June 1918, which emphasizes this broad definition of citizenship. No one questions, of course, the good faith of the political Zionists in thus placing themselves on a sound democratic basis, but the point is that they *contradict* the principle of their platform the moment they combine the adjective "Jewish" with "State." The adjective and noun do not agree; they are mutually exclusive. The Jewish State can protect the rights of all citizens irrespective of their nationality. It can tolerate them. It can give them large privileges, but how can such a State possibly give them full rights of citizenship, when the very name of the State implies a government organized on the basis of a *single* nationality and controlled by that nationality. Or, if you choose, you can put it in this way — how can a State remain Jewish if it abandons the basis upon which alone it has any meaning? Will not the resulting condition be precisely that of which many Jews complain even in countries in which they enjoy full political rights, that they are merely protected and tolerated and given certain privileges without being regarded as forming an integral part of the country? Will not those in Palestine who do not belong to the Jewish nationality find them-

selves precisely in this position of not forming an integral part of the country? If the principle is wrong in one case, it is equally wrong in the other. I do not see any escape from such a conclusion. The principle *is* wrong, for a modern democratic State cannot recognize any distinctions among its citizens because of varying religious proclivities or because of varying national origins, since the former is a purely personal factor and the latter an accidental one. Such distinctions will lead to internal dissensions and, what is more, will result in an intolerable segregation of groups within a population.

And lastly in this connection, even though the political Zionists claim that their movement is not religious — and it may be granted that it is not — to the outside world the term Jewish carries with it a religious connotation. You cannot escape from that. The man of the street is impatient of subtle distinctions. To him the term Jewish means one who by birth or by conviction belongs to a certain faith. All Jews are alike to him, and since, as a matter of fact, the majority of those Jews who are in Palestine or who will go there will also be Jews by religion and not merely in the nationalistic sense in which political Zionists wish to use the term, a Jewish State would necessarily imply some kind of

a bond between religion and nationality, precisely as the liberal Priestly Code above quoted still assumes this point — in fact takes it for granted as a matter of course. Will the Jews who have settled in Palestine and those who will go there as members of the religious body, strongly attached to the ancestral faith, be satisfied to have an absolute separation from church and state, so that in the Jewish State to be organized there will be *no* laws touching upon religion in any way? Even if the State should be organized theoretically on the basis of a divorce between religion and the State, would not Judaism in a Jewish State by sheer necessity continue to present precisely that double aspect of a religion *and* a nationality which, we have seen, it carried with it through the ages until in modern times Reformed Judaism broke the thread? The Jewish State will, therefore, mean, even from the standpoint of religion, a step backward, a reversion to the condition which interpreted religion in terms of the group. It will involve a step back to a condition which has been found to be incompatible with the spirit of the age. The State if formed will be handicapped at the outset by this close and inevitable affiliation with religion. Even if the State should not suffer from the combination, the religion will be checked in its

natural growth and, what is more, the Jews, particularly the nine-tenths who will permanently remain outside of Palestine, will suffer by being placed in an anomalous position. The Jewish Question instead of being solved, as the Zionists hope through their plan, will receive a new complication. It is to that aspect of the fallacy of political Zionism that in the concluding section I now turn.

VIII

POLITICAL ZIONISM AND THE JEWISH QUESTION

THE political Zionists appear to have been impressed by the opposition which the proposition to convert Palestine into a Jewish State has aroused among native Mohammedans and Christians as well as among the Jews and Christians of this country, England and France,¹ and perhaps also by the logic

¹ In England a "League of British Jews," led by such prominent Englishmen as Claude G. Montefiore, Israel Abrahams, and Lord Swaythling has been formed; in the United States a statement setting forth objections to the Jewish State has been prepared (see the Appendix), and with the signatures of 300 prominent American Jews attached, representing all parts of the United States and men in all professions and in the various walks of life, has been forwarded to the Peace Conference through President Wilson. In France a non-sectarian Society composed of Catholics, Protestants and Jews has been organized known as "Friends of the Holy Land," which likewise has taken a definite stand against the aim of the political Zionists. This organization has republished in English and French the article of Herbert Adams Gibbons which appeared in the January number of the *Century Magazine* and which set forth in clear and vigorous language, from the standpoint of a student of the East, the reasons why political Zionism is unacceptable.

of the objections urged by such eminent authorities as Sir George Adam Smith¹ and others whose general sympathy with that part of the Zionistic program which seeks to find a safe homeland for Jewish colonists in Palestine, adds weight to their views. A distinct tendency towards the modification of the political program of the Zionists has set in. It is now declared by those qualified to speak for the Zionists that there is no intention at present of asking that Palestine be handed over to the Jews, but only that assurances be given of non-interference with the movement of further immigration of Jews to that country, and that the status of the Jewish colonists be recognized in a legal form so as to secure their complete protection and, I suppose, also, their local autonomy — to which, of course, there is no objection. The President of the American Federation of Zionists has gone even further and is quoted as declaring that a Jewish State for the present must remain a dream, to be realized only when the Jews shall form the majority in Palestine. This position seems to have been generally

¹ In his monograph above referred to, *Syria and the Holy Land*, pp. 52-57 (London, 1918). See also an able article on Zionism by Prof. Kemper Fullerton of Oberlin College, in the *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. X (1917), pp. 313-335.

accepted, and the further assurance is given that political Zionism aims to take over the affairs of the country in a perfectly natural way under the workings of the law of the majority. One hears little at present of the point that Dr. Herzl pressed so emphatically in his "Jewish State," that one of the aims of the Jewish State was to act as a powerful means, through the channels of diplomacy, in exerting pressure over governments in which Jews are subject to injustice and maltreatment. Herzl and his followers visualized a Jewish State which would be regarded as a national center by all Jewry with the authority to speak for the 15 million Jews scattered throughout the world. The Jewish State would be the mouthpiece for Jews everywhere. This dream, it appears, has been shattered, and properly so, for it soon became obvious after the organization of political Zionism that the movement was not going to unite the Jews into a single body. Each succeeding Jewish Congress showed more clearly than its predecessor that while Zionism did form a bond sufficiently strong to bring together for the first time Jews from all parts of the Western world, the bond lacked the element of permanency because of the emphasis upon nationality, which the subsequent course of events showed would be the rock

on which any endeavor to unite the Jews politically would suffer shipwreck. It is instinctively felt, even if it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated by the great body of Jews in those lands in which they have become assimilated to the prevailing political and social conditions, in countries like England, France, United States, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and to a large extent even in Germany and Austria, that in some way the appeal to Jewish nationalism *conflicts* with the complete attachment for the nation to which the Jews, living in any of the countries named, belong and should belong. Any political interest in a Jewish State established elsewhere would have a taint of hyphenation or of divided allegiance. I do not speak here from the point of view of policy, nor have I in mind the fear of arousing a *suspicion* of hyphenation, but from the feeling which every 100 per cent American, Englishman or Frenchman would naturally and spontaneously harbor that beyond a sentimental or historical interest in any other country but his own, whether because he formerly belonged to that country or had associations with it that have attached him to it, he must not yield to the temptation to look upon such a country as a kind of second home. It is impossible to belong to two countries,

and if one makes the effort, complete attachment to one must necessarily be impaired. "Allegiance must be perfect — cannot be divided. Either a Palestinian or an American."¹

Involuntarily and in subtle fashion one's Americanism, to take our own country as an example, is affected by a divided attachment of any character. This may not go to the extent of affecting one's patriotic duties, but a divided allegiance will affect the spirit in which one carries out one's duties. The mental concentration on the one and only country to which individuals should feel themselves as belonging would be lacking. This lack is injurious and will prevent one from responding spontaneously to the pulsations of the political and social life about him.

The recent experience through which this country has passed has shown the dangers inherent in the encouragement of any kind of hyphenation. The trying position in which hundreds of thousands of loyal American citizens were placed because in days of peace and in an unsuspecting manner they had permitted their feelings for Germany, due to sentimental or personal attachment, unbounded sway, should serve as a warning now that peace has come again, to avoid a repetition of such a condition.

¹ Felix Adler, *Nationalism and Zionism*, p. 14 (an address published by the American Ethical Union, New York, 1919).

We were obliged to go to war with Germany because by her policy and by her military methods, she represented a menace to the freedom of the world. This occasioned a painful struggle in the hearts of those who, without being conscious of any hyphenation, yet were the unfortunate victims of a divided allegiance; and this despite the fact that it was a long and short division, and the part they gave to Germany was only a small percentage. The present advocates of political Zionism appear to recognize how dangerous it is in the present temper of the world to play with such combustible material as is involved in the question of allegiance to the country to which one belongs. Accordingly, it is declared that the Jews remaining outside of Palestine will not be affected by the organization of a small Jewish State. But is that true? Will the nine-tenths of the Jews, who will not technically belong to the Jewish nation, escape the implication that they nevertheless form part of a separate Jewish nationality, and will not this necessarily affect the status of the nine-tenths? A moment's reflection will show that the Jewish State will again play directly into the hands of those who are only too eager to seize upon such a weapon to justify their social prejudice and deeper hostility, precisely as the con-

clusion drawn by Herzl and his followers that the feeling towards the Jews was due to their being a separate nationality — an alien element in the body politic of European countries — appeared to justify the contention of the German and Austrian anti-Semites. “What of it,” political Zionists say, in reply, “if those who will under any circumstances maintain their feelings against Jews are given an excuse that will be recognized as a mere flimsy pretense?” The answer is that the situation created by the organization of a Jewish State, no matter how small, with the necessary emphasis on a separate Jewish nationality as its *raison d'être*, will enhance the difficulties of the Jews all over the world in combating the social prejudice or other forms of hostility that exist or that may arise. It will retard the political assimilation of the Jews even in more advanced countries in which reactionary movements like anti-Semitism have left their mark. It will certainly create obstacles in the way of those who are laboring to secure full political recognition for Jews in Russia, Poland and Roumania. Let us bear in mind once more that the average person has little patience with subtle distinctions. He will not be apt to draw a line between a Jew naturalized as a citizen of the United

States, England or France, and one who belongs to a Jewish State in Palestine — nor would he pay much heed to the fact that the vast majority of Jews — at least nine-tenths — would not belong to that State. That the proposed Jewish State will look for support to Jews living outside of Palestine — not only for financial aid but for moral support and sympathy — will appear to justify the conclusion that Jews everywhere harbor a peculiar attachment towards the nationalistic one-tenth associated with Palestine; and indeed many will undoubtedly have such an attachment. The term American Jew suggests no hyphenation, any more than American Catholic or American Protestant. It merely connotes a religious affiliation, or an association connected with the accidental factor of birth and descent, just as American Irish or American German expresses the national origin of the individual in question; but the existence of a Jewish State will invert the position of the two terms. The American Jew will become the Jewish American, and this is a hyphen precisely of the same objectionable character as the German-American proved to be in the recent war.

Are political Zionists quite sure that in case of a conflict between the country of their birth or adop-

tion and Palestine they will not to any degree be influenced by the possible hyphenation?

It is quite within the range of possibility that a condition may arise, even under the rule of the world by a League of Nations, when through political complications the proposed Jewish State may find itself in opposition to some other state or vice versa, some state will have a quarrel with the Jewish State. Such a contingency might place the Jews everywhere in a most uncomfortable position to say the least. No doubt they will give their allegiance to the land in which they dwell but with many it may involve a struggle to do so, and this element will at least be open to a suspicion affecting all the others, as in the recent war American citizens of German birth or remote German origin were put in the suspect class. They had to give proof of their loyalty instead of such loyalty being taken for granted, and many innocent people suffered because of the open or disguised disloyalty, or even of the indiscretions of a few. Can we be quite sure that in case of such a conflict as is here hypothecated and which at any time may arise, some Jews having sympathy with their fellows may not commit indiscretions reflecting on all? The world has always been disposed to generalize in regard to the Jews,

and human nature does not change perceptibly from century to century.

Now look at a situation that will certainly arise if the Jewish State is formed. What attitude will that State take towards political Zionists who are Germans or Austrians? Dr. Herzl himself was an Austrian, and some of the most prominent and efficient leaders of the movement before the outbreak of the war were to be found in the lands of the Central Powers. The center of the Zionist organization was at one time in Germany. If Dr. Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, were alive to-day, is it conceivable that with the present attitude of the world towards Germany and Austria he would be permitted to go to Palestine to take part in the organization of a Jewish State, the idea of which he called into being? Palestine, it is generally conceded, will be placed under the mandatory power of Great Britain. What will be the natural attitude of that government in regard to German and Austrian Jews who wish to settle in Palestine? Would Great Britain be criticized if she decided to shut out all immigrants from Germany and Austria as well as from Turkey (or what remains of Turkey) and Bulgaria for a considerable number of years? Will she even after this prohibition is removed be likely

to allow Germans and Austrians to take part in the political life of a country under her direction? German influence was particularly strong in Palestine prior to the war, and even the Zionists had their struggle with the German brethren who wanted to force the introduction of German into the training school for teachers in Jaffa,¹ and in which they were aided by the German Consul General. This was in 1913. What, in view of this incident and of all that has happened since 1914, will be the attitude of the political Zionists themselves towards German and Austrian Zionists who form such a considerable contingent — in fact next to Russians, the strongest contingent. The Zionists will probably be wise enough not to try to force the issue, but will prefer to place themselves in an anomalous position by declaring that the Jewish State for the present must taboo Jews from the very lands in which the movement took definite shape. Here, then, we have immediately a complication that may be taken as a sample of the kind of difficulties that will arise through the endeavor to hold up the Jews as forming a distinct nationality to be welded into a political

¹ See a brief account of this struggle in an article on "The Educational Institutions of Palestine," in *Kadimah* (New York American Federation of Zionists, 1918), pp. 95-100.

unit composed of a single nationality. If a quarrel were to break out between England and Russia, during the period of the exercise of the mandatory power by Great Britain over Palestine, it might similarly lead to the exclusion of Russian Jews, to whom the Zionistic movement is due.

It will be admitted that the fourteen million Jews who will always live outside of Palestine cannot afford to have themselves thus placed in an anomalous and risky position by the one-tenth who may choose to regard themselves as a national body. They will object to a small minority representing itself as the Jewish nation, and which the rest of the world will naturally assume to have the authority to speak for all. The existence of such a tiny Jewish State representing at the most one-tenth of all the Jews, therefore, so far from helping to solve the Jewish Question, will only succeed in complicating it in various directions. In the first place it will arouse the opposition of the natives of Palestine and of the adjoining Syria who will resent being pushed to the wall; secondly it will create hyphenated Jews all over the world; and thirdly it will place Jews outside of Palestine in a position that will oblige them in self-defense to present a decided attitude of opposition to their fellows who insist upon their sepa-

rate nationalism. Political Zionism, instead of serving to unite the Jews, will create further splits of the most serious character, and the upshot of the movement will be to keep alive the spirit of opposition in those lands in which the Jews are treated as aliens without political rights.

Surely the most important problem for Jews at present interested in the welfare of their brethren, more important even than the encouragement of the colonization of Palestine, is to secure for those living in such large numbers in countries like Russia, Roumania and Poland, constituting almost one-half of all the Jews in the world, complete rights and duties of citizenship, both because such rights are demanded by the conditions under which modern states are organized, and as a protection against indignities and sufferings to which they are constantly exposed in the countries in which they live, but which they are precluded from regarding as their country. It is gratifying to see that both in Poland and Roumania a decided disposition exists among the leaders in favor of granting equal rights to the Jewish population, and the President of the newly organized Republic of Bohemia has come out strongly against regarding the Jews in that country as a separate national unit. The Peace Conference, it is

hoped, will emphasize the necessity for all the newly organized states to place themselves on the principle of equal political rights to all the inhabitants. But it must be obvious that this movement will be hindered if the Jews themselves raise the cry that they represent a separate nationalistic unit in the very populations among which they live. It is to be particularly regretted that the recent so-called Jewish Congress held in Philadelphia paved the way for a possible reactionary tendency by emphasizing "Jewish nationalism" not only in connection with the Palestinian problem, but as applicable also to the countries of Western Europe. The attitude of some of those who attended this Congress as delegates was amazingly frank in laying the stress on "national" rights of the Jews in countries outside of Palestine instead of on equal rights.¹ No American delegate at the congress with a keen feeling of his Americanism can possibly have approved of such an un-American spirit, but the sentiment voiced illustrates the direction toward which political Zionism drifts as the result of the emphasis on nationalism. It is a serious indictment against po-

¹ A declaration issued by the "National Socialist" Group of Zionists maintains the "right of the *national* union of Jews in all countries in respect to education, culture and language."

litical Zionism that the principle upon which it rests leads some of those who adhere to it to justify the organization of the Jews as a separate unit in other countries than Palestine. Dividing a population into separate nationalistic units instead of welding the various nationalities into a single nation is subversive of the very foundation upon which democracy rests. There is no greater danger to democracy than the recognition of an *imperium in imperio*. With the Jews themselves interpreting their status in the world as that of a separate nationality, there will always remain a Jewish Question and it will always remain unsolved.

† The Jewish Question! What is the Jewish Question but the struggle to secure for Jews in all lands the same political rights as their fellow-citizens. That is the only solution possible because the only one compatible with the spirit of democracy that was ushered into the Western world at the close of the eighteenth century and that has, despite all reactionary efforts, despite all checks and hindrances, made steady progress. The improvement in the political and social status of the Jews in all European countries — barring a few exceptions — since the new spirit set in furnishes the proof that the line of progress has been steadily upward. Not that

this improved status is the only index of this progress, but it is one of the indications of real progress made that the curve marked by the fortunes of the Jews during the last century mounts steadily. Step by step the civic disabilities under which the Jews labored were removed in most of the states of Europe, and this in spite of the opposition of reactionaries. The steady march of democracy has meant the growing triumph for the idea underlying it, and it is this triumph that has made for the political and social assimilation of Jews in one country after the other, until to-day it is taken for granted by all leaders of liberal thought that equal rights to all citizens must form the foundation stone on which a state is to be reared. The Jews by virtue of their survival through dark ages of persecution and intolerance are the living witnesses to testify to the ultimate failure of all reactionary tendencies.

It is true that the reactionary spirit has not been conquered everywhere, but instead of fixing our gaze in a bewildered attitude on reactionary symptoms, we should rather in a spirit of hope and encouragement base our judgment of the future of the Jews and of their ultimate destiny, on the steady progress in their civic emancipation during the past century and more. The spirit of democracy has

never been stronger in any period of the world's history than at the close of this war, fought to safeguard democracy. Even the extremes to which the spirit is being carried in some countries, reacting against the pressure under which they formerly were cramped, is a testimony to the strength of the spirit. The extravagances and the abuses will correct themselves in time. Surely this is not the moment to raise the cry of despair because difficulties exist which should call forth one's courage to surmount them, because reactionary forces are still endeavoring to assert themselves and which it should be our aim to overcome. Even while recognizing that the world's progress is necessarily slow, at times painfully slow, the present juncture in the affairs of men and of nations invites us to turn our faces forward and not backward, to realize more decidedly than ever that so far as the Jews are concerned their place is *in* the seething world around them, the world seething with fresh life and enlarged hopes, and not in a restricted glorified ghetto which would be the result of the creation of a tiny Jewish State by a tiny minority of the Jews.

The mere fact that Palestine can never hold more than a small minority of the Jews of the world constitutes by itself a most potent argument against the

creation of a Jewish State even if it were desirable, as it also shows how fallacious it is to seek for a solution of the Jewish Question by the creation of such a state. Let me in concluding this analysis set forth somewhat more explicitly this aspect of the Zionist movement.

Political Zionists have succeeded by virtue of their enthusiasm in creating the impression that Palestine would have room for several million Jews. Some go so far as to say five or six millions. This is an entirely misleading view and needs to be exposed. Palestine at present holds a population estimated somewhere between 600,000 and 700,000, of which about 60 per cent are Mohammedans, 28 per cent Christians, and 12 per cent Jews. On the basis of a careful investigation undertaken by a commission of French experts sent to Palestine during the summer of 1918, and which included Professor Sylvain Lévi, the distinguished Orientalist of the Collège de France, it can now be authoritatively stated that, including improved methods of agriculture and the redemption of certain arid tracts, there would be room in Palestine proper for an additional population of 600,000. That would mean that at the utmost Palestine can harbor in the future a population of one and a half millions. Beyond that the

economic pressure on a too thickly settled district in proportion to its ability to yield support would create misery and ruin. Now, assuming that the additional 600,000 will be entirely composed of Jews, this would give a maximum of 700,000 Jewish inhabitants as the utmost figure without driving the 600,000 Mohammedans and Christians away. Since immigration to Palestine can hardly proceed more rapidly than on an average of 25,000 a year, about a quarter of a century would have to elapse before the Jewish population would reach the position of being in a majority; and according to the program of the political Zionists the Jewish State is not to be called into existence until that point has been reached in the Jewish population. In this calculation, however, there is omitted the important element of the natural growth of the present population of Palestine. Despite unfavorable and unsanitary conditions of life in a large part of the country and the great death rate among children, as is the case throughout all the neglected portions of the Near East, the increase of population in Palestine has been steady though naturally not large. Under better conditions that will certainly prevail when Palestine comes under the supervision of the mandatory power of Great Britain, the natural increase

in population will grow larger. If it reaches an average of only two per cent yearly the result will be that the full contingent of 600,000 additional to the population will be contributed in large part by the natives. The present Jewish population of Palestine would itself become a factor in reducing the possible number of Jews that could come from the outside world to find room in that small country. The likelihood of the Jews ever reaching the position of being in a decided majority is thus reduced and the great difference between the present proportion, — 12 per cent as against 88 per cent Mohammedans and Christians — is too large to be overcome by any normal process. The alternative is to drive the non-Jewish population out of the country (which, of course, the political Zionists have no intention of doing), or to force them out by economic pressure, which may conceivably take place. Either prospect is not pleasant to contemplate. Let us assume that through superior advantages enjoyed by the Jews who come to Palestine they will in the competitive struggle succeed in obtaining control. It matters little how this end will be obtained. Even if it should come by the most perfectly natural process, the feelings of the natives as they see themselves driven to the wall, becoming more and more de-

pendent upon those who are usurping their place, will not be any the less bitter on that account. The reaction of such a situation will be felt by the Jews all over the world. It is assuredly a serious matter to propose a policy which *must*, even if involuntarily, work injustice and hardships for others as a condition of its being carried out. Mankind looks forward hopefully, though also timidly, to a time when animosities, particularly those arising through differences of religious belief, will tend to diminish and eventually disappear. There can be no substantial progress towards the ideals of peace unless we envisage the possibility of such a gradual decline in the unfriendly attitude of nations and of religious sects towards one another. The least that we ought to do is not to create *new* conditions which will intensify old animosities and promote new forms of unfriendliness. The program of the political Zionists, however, is precisely of a character to entail such a possibility. The mere suspicion that the purpose in encouraging Jewish immigration into Palestine is to secure control of the country will arouse resentment; and, as a matter of fact, steps are already being taken by Mohammedans and Christians to prevent lands from falling into the hands of Jews.

The Zionistic program invites the possibility of a fate for Palestine as tragic as the misrule of the Turk. It will be sad indeed, if a land filled with sacred associations should again become a battlefield on which in the past such bitter contests were waged in the name of religion. One need not be a prophet of gloom to recognize the possibility of a renewed outbreak of religious animosities in a country like Palestine of the present day, where you start out with an already existing intense mutual feeling of hostility, not to say hatred, among the various classes of the population, Mohammedans, Christians and Jews. To the Western visitor who goes to Palestine for the first time it is a painful surprise to witness how little influence life amid sacred associations exerts in promoting kindness and gentleness among those who are privileged to spend their days near the sacred spots. In Palestine the individual is *labeled* according to his faith. One encounters narrowness, bigotry, fanaticism everywhere.¹

How, then, is it conceivable that the creation of a Jewish State will be able to furnish a solution for

¹ See a picture of these conditions in present-day Palestine by Joseph Koven, in his article "Palestine: Lights and Shadows" in the April number (1919) of the *Century Magazine*.

any aspect of the Jewish Question? It will not solve the problem for the Russian Jew, whose condition is the worst, because it cannot accommodate at the most more than one-tenth even of the Russian Jewish population;¹ and this small proportion could only reach this haven of refuge after the lapse of a quarter of a century. What is to become, meanwhile, of the remaining more than nine-tenths of the Jews scattered throughout the Russian Empire?

The tiny Jewish State can certainly not exert any pressure on Russia and Roumania with a view of improving the status of the Jews in these countries. By the admission of the political Zionists, the Jewish State would only be qualified to speak for that small portion of Jewry which regards itself as a nationality and which, we have seen, is probably not above five per cent, outside of those who live in Russia and those who view the situation from the Russian-Jewish standpoint. We have also seen that the reorganization of a Jewish State, so far from promoting the movement to grant equal rights to Jews everywhere, will hinder it by leading many Jews, as is actually the case, to emphasize that the

¹ According to the statistics of the *American Jewish Year-Book* for 1918-19, p. 340, the total number of Jews in the Russian Empire, including what was Russian Poland, is 6,946,000.

Jews in every country should constitute a separate nationality. It would hinder the movement for the solution of the Jewish Question also by tending to keep alive mutual animosities among the three classes of the present inhabitants of Palestine; and this animosity will react on the Jews everywhere. It will further hinder it by placing in the hands of those who for one reason or the other do not *wish* to see Jews admitted to full citizenship in such lands as Russia, Poland and Roumania a weapon that can be used against this claim. It will create new complications of the Jewish Question by placing nine-tenths — or rather, more than nine-tenths, as we may now say,— of the Jews who will permanently remain outside of Palestine in a position where they will encounter greater difficulties in overcoming social prejudice and in efforts to improve the status of their less fortunate brethren.

So far from increasing the respect for Jews as the political Zionists also claim, the Jewish State will serve to strengthen the hands of reactionaries whose interest it is to keep alive the spirit of anti-Semitism. Above all it will serve to push into the background those elements of Judaism, viewed as a religion, which are universalistic in their implication and in their application, and instead will bring

out in bold relief the separatistic features of the religion — the rites and ceremonies which, when strictly carried out, of themselves tend to create a wall of separation between Jews and their fellows. These rites and ceremonies have their proper place, of course, in Judaism, as in any other religion. They should call forth our respect when observed by those to whom they are the expression of a faith in which they sincerely believe; but for all that, they are the *externals* of the religion. Behind and beneath these rites are the ideals for which a religion stands. The creation of a Jewish State will serve to emphasize, at least for the outside world, not the religious *ideas*, but the religious *practices*, many of which antedate the days of Judaism itself and were preserved merely through the weight of tradition. Such emphasis upon externals would be unfortunate from every point of view; it would mark a step backward in the effort to realize the religious ideals.

And now, a final question. Why a Jewish State in Palestine, when all that those who have gone there and those who propose to settle in that country have in mind can be accomplished just as well, if not indeed better, without it? Why a Jewish State when what is needed for those who wish to create for themselves a future under better auspices than is

possible at present in their surroundings, is a home in which they may feel secure, a land in which they will enjoy full rights of citizenship, a country which will be protected against aggression by the League of Nations? Why a Jewish State, when the majority of orthodox Jews to whom attachment to Palestine is more than a sentiment or a doctrine of faith, will not look with favor upon a resuscitation undertaken from a purely secular standpoint as a national movement without a religious background? Why a Jewish State which would certainly not satisfy those who look to the fulfillment of divine prophecy, and which will be a disillusionment to those who believe that it will form the solution of the Jewish Question? Why a Jewish State which will never be representative of more than a small fraction of the Jews and which will meet with the constant opposition of the large majority, who will look upon it with ill favor and suspicion? Why a Jewish State, when even for cultural autonomy all that is needed or desirable is fulfilled by complete local autonomy for the Jewish colonies now established in Palestine and to be established? Such local autonomy will without much question be granted by the mandatory power, and cheerfully so, for Great Britain will encourage Jewish coloniza-

tion in every possible way. It is through such colonies, formed by enthusiastic and energetic newcomers, ready to work under a communal stimulus, that the land can be redeemed from the neglect into which it has been allowed to lapse through Turkish misrule and through the existence of a government which did little or nothing for its people, for the improvement of the land or for education and that took no thought of making the population fit for self-government. All honor to the zeal of the Jewish colonists in Palestine in having already changed the aspect of certain portions of the country through successful agriculture and viniculture. Let us pay due meed to what has been done by the colonists themselves for the improvement of the land by the Zionistic organizations, as well as by high-minded philanthropists, in promoting education by establishing trade and technical schools.

The Zionists say a "national homeland," controlled by Jews, is needed in order that as Jews they may develop a culture of their own and make their further contributions to the world; that a country of their own is needed and a language of their own, as an essential condition of producing this result. Now we have seen that the best contributions of the Jews have been made since their dispersion through-

out the country under the stimulating contact with others, and we have also seen that outside of the religion which they gave through the Prophets and the literature which sprung from it, the Jews made no contributions while they had a separate national existence. Why should it be different under another trial of the experiment, particularly when this experiment will necessarily involve that only a small proportion of the Jewish people will participate in it? We have seen that the great civilizations of antiquity, as in modern times, have all been produced by the mixture of nationalities and not by a single nationality, isolating itself from others and proceeding in its own unimpeded way. Culture is the spark that ensues when diverse ethnic forces meet. One reason perhaps, apart from the geographical position of Palestine, why the Jews during their national existence did not make any striking contributions to civilization was just because they were not *sufficiently* mixed. Under modern conditions of life mixture of nationalities is a normal condition — isolation the abnormal that leads to sterility. It is by a constant crossing of currents and countercurrents that modern progress and culture proceed. A Jewish State would necessarily emphasize isolation, and if it did not it would cease to be a Jewish

State. The fundamental principle underlying the plan for the formation of a Jewish State is thus in contradiction not only to the testimony borne by the past history of the Jews, it runs not only contrary to the trend of Jewish history during the past 2000 years, it not only ignores the changes that have come over Palestine during this period, the entirely different country that it has become, but it is also contrary to the general trend and spirit of the age. But granted that the Jews of Palestine should be placed in a position to make their independent and cultural contribution, granted even that for this purpose it is necessary to resuscitate the old Hebrew language in order to make it the medium of their thoughts and aspirations — though this movement has an artificial aspect which does not particularly commend it — even for this purpose a Jewish State is not needed. All that is required is a congenial environment with freedom of movement; and these two conditions are fulfilled by giving the colonies complete independence in the management of their local affairs. For cultural autonomy no State is required.

Why, then, all this agitation for the satisfaction of a sentiment which, though impressive from the romantic aspect, is fraught with such great dangers

when the attempt is made to convert it into a reality — danger to the Jews of Palestine in adding a further discordant element to the many that already exist there, instead of improving the relations of the various elements of the population to one another, as well as danger to Jews outside of Palestine who will be placed in a wrong position before the world through the misinterpretation of the trend of Jewish history; danger also to the principle of democracy through the creation of a State based on the undemocratic principle of a single nationality in a country which is marked by the presence of many nationalities. For be it emphasized once more, that since a country belongs to all who live in it, irrespective of ethnic descent and without reference to racial affiliation, the creation of a Jewish State necessarily impresses one as a reactionary project, and this despite the fact that those who advocate it are undoubtedly high-minded, sincerely enthusiastic, but unfortunately blinded by a romantic sentiment, wrongly interpreted. Palestine of all countries, by virtue of its fortunes which have made it a sacred land for the followers of three great religions, should become under the ægis of the new era which is opening for the entire East, a state organized on an intra-national basis.

The Palestinian question forms part of the general plan for the resuscitation and reorganization of countries in the Near East.¹ It needs to be settled by the application of those general principles of political freedom and political guidance for long-neglected peoples, which will enable them to become fit again for self-government and build up a new East that may join with the West in contributing to the future progress of humanity.

What higher destiny can there be for Palestine than to become a center, symbolizing by the political union of the many nationalities that have found their home there, the coming together of peoples which is the very keynote of the international conference that has ensued upon the termination of the great war? The world, storm-tossed by the disasters of the last four years, longs for peace. Where is that peace to come from if we throw new apples of contention into the ring? What better beginning can be made toward bringing about enduring peace among nations than by furnishing an example of a practical "League of Nations" through the setting aside of *one* place in the world in which all the nations of Europe and America and

¹ See Jastrow, *The War and the Bagdad Railway*, pp. 143-152.

many parts of Asia and Africa already have a share. What a happy destiny it would be for Palestine to be reorganized in such a manner as to present a prospect at least of that peace of which one of the ancient Prophets gave us so impressive a description, a country "in which swords shall be beaten into plow-shares and spears into pruning hooks," and where nation shall not lift sword against nation, where there will be no need for drilling men for war, and in which everyone shall sit under his vine and his figtree and "there will be none to make him afraid." A dream perhaps, the realization of which, even though limited to one spot in the world, it may be idle to look forward to — perhaps! It must be confessed that we are still far from the realization of that dream, and yet the world needs the vision to cheer it on in its course, to comfort it for its sufferings and to retain the hope for the future.

It would be nothing short of *sacrilegious* to miss the present opportunity to reorganize Palestine on the broadest possible basis, the basis suggested by its eventful history and by its present position as a genuine gathering-place of nations because of the sacred associations with which that land is filled. I plead for a Palestine reorganized as this country

is, as are England, France, Italy and other European lands — on the broad platform of democracy. I plead for a Palestinian State in which all who are there and all who go there will share alike in helping it to fulfill what would appear to be its manifest destiny, an example that peoples gathered from all quarters of the globe are able to live together in amity and join in forming a new national unit — a Palestinian State. I should like to envisage a Palestine that may become a beacon-light for the world, that may again become a spiritual focus, furnishing further inspiration for mankind as it proceeds in its march through the ages to a still higher, albeit unknown and unknowable, goal. Such a Palestine is worth striving for, and I should like to see the Jews, — the Zionists, if you please, — take an honorable share in bringing about a Palestine that may look forward to such a future. Such a Palestine, however, cannot be built up through the creation of a Jewish State. A Jewish State would simply mean a glorified ghetto, narrow in its outlook, undemocratic in its organization, and that may well turn out to be reactionary in its tendencies.

APPENDIX

A STATEMENT TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE ¹

As a future form of government for Palestine will undoubtedly be considered by the approaching Peace Conference, we, the undersigned citizens of the United States, unite in this statement, setting forth our objections to the organization of a Jewish State in Palestine as proposed by the Zionist Societies in this country and Europe and to the segregation of the Jews as a nationalistic unit in any country.

We feel that in so doing we are voicing the opinion of the majority of American Jews born in this country and of those foreign born who have lived here long enough to thoroughly assimilate American political and social conditions. The American Zionists represent, according to the most recent statistics available, only a small proportion of the Jews living in this country, about 150,000 out of 3,500,000. (*American Jewish Year Book* 1918, Philadelphia.)

¹ Handed to President Wilson on behalf of the signers by Congressman Julius Kahn on March 4th, 1919, for transmission to the Peace Conference at Paris. See above, p. 117, note 1. The statement was prepared conjointly by the Rev. Dr. Henry Berkowitz, of Philadelphia, Mr. Max Senior, of Cincinnati, and Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania.

At the outset we wish to indicate our entire sympathy with the efforts of Zionists which aim to secure for Jews at present living in lands of oppression a refuge in Palestine or elsewhere, where they may freely develop their capabilities and carry on their activities as free citizens.

But we raise our voices in warning and protest against the demand of the Zionists for the reorganization of the Jews as a national unit, to whom, now or in the future, territorial sovereignty in Palestine shall be committed. This demand not only misinterprets the trend of the history of the Jews, who ceased to be a nation 2000 years ago, but involves the limitation and possible annulment of the larger claims of Jews for full citizenship and human rights in all lands in which those rights are not yet secure. For the very reason that the new era upon which the world is entering aims to establish government everywhere on principles of true democracy, we reject the Zionist project of a "national home for the Jewish people in Palestine."

Zionism arose as a result of the intolerable conditions under which Jews have been forced to live in Russia and Roumania. But it is evident that for the Jewish population of these countries, variously estimated at from six to ten millions, Palestine can become no homeland. Even with the improvement of the neglected condition of this country, its limited area can offer no solution. The Jewish question in Russia and Roumania can be settled only within those coun-

tries by the grant of full rights of citizenship to Jews.

We are all the more opposed to the Zionists, because they, themselves, distinctly repudiate the solely ameliorative program. They demand and hail with delight the "Balfour Declaration" to establish "a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine," *i. e.*, a home not merely for Jews living in countries in which they are oppressed, but for Jews universally. No Jew, wherever he may live, can consider himself free from the implications of such a grant.

The willingness of Jews interested in the welfare of their brethren to aid in redeeming Palestine from the blight of centuries of Turkish misrule, is no acceptance of the Zionist project to segregate Jews as a political unit and to re-institute a section of such a political unit in Palestine or elsewhere.

At the present juncture in the world's affairs when lands that have hitherto been subjected to foreign domination are to be recognized as free and independent states, we rejoice in the avowed proposal of the Peace Congress to put into practical application the fundamental principles of democracy. That principle, which asserts equal rights for all citizens of a state, irrespective of creed or ethnic descent, should be applied in such a manner as to exclude segregation of any kind, be it nationalistic or other. Such segregation must inevitably create differences among the sections of the population of a country. Any such plan of segregation is necessarily reactionary in its tendency, undemocratic in spirit and totally contrary

to the practices of free government, especially as these are exemplified by our own country. We therefore strongly urge the abandonment of such a basis for the reorganization of any state.

OBJECTIONS TO SEGREGATION OF JEWS AS A POLITICAL
UNIT

Against such a political segregation of the Jews in Palestine or elsewhere we object:

1. Because the Jews are dedicated heart and soul to the welfare of the countries in which they dwell under free conditions. All Jews repudiate every suspicion of a double allegiance, but to our minds it is necessarily implied in and cannot by any logic be eliminated from the establishment of a sovereign State for the Jews in Palestine.

By the large part taken by them in the great war, the Jews have once and for all shattered the base aspersions of the Anti-Semites which charged them with being aliens in every land, incapable of true patriotism and prompted only by sinister and self-seeking motives. Moreover, it is safe to assume that the overwhelming bulk of the Jews of America, England, France, Italy, Holland, Switzerland and the other lands of freedom, have no thought whatever of surrendering their citizenship in these lands in order to resort to a "Jewish homeland in Palestine." As a rule those who favor such a restoration advocate it not for themselves but for others. Those who act thus, and yet insist on their patriotic attachment to

the countries of which they are citizens, are self-deceived in their profession of Zionism and under the spell of an emotional romanticism or of a religious sentiment fostered through centuries of gloom.

2. We also object to political segregation of Jews for those who take their Zionistic professions seriously as referring not to "others" but to themselves. Granted that the establishment of a sovereign Jewish State in Palestine would lead many to emigrate to that land, the political conditions of the millions who would be unable to migrate for generations to come, if ever, would be made far more precarious. Roumania — despite the pledges of the Berlin Treaty — has legally branded her Jews as aliens, though many are descended from families settled in that country longer than the present Roumanian government has existed. The establishment of a Jewish State will manifestly serve the malevolent rulers of that and other lands as a new justification for additional repressive legislation. The multitudes who remain would be subject to worse perils, if possible, even though the few who escape might prosper in Palestine.

3. We object to the political segregation also of those who might succeed in establishing themselves in Palestine. The proposition involves dangers which, it is manifest, have not had the serious consideration of those who are so zealous in its advocacy. These dangers are adverted to in a most kindly spirit of warning by Sir George Adam Smith, who is generally acknowledged to be the greatest authority in the

world on everything connected with Palestine, either past or present. In a recent publication, *Syria and the Holy Land*, he points out that there is absolutely no fixity to the boundaries of Palestine. These have varied greatly in the course of the centuries. The claims to various sections of this undefined territory would unquestionably evoke bitter controversies. "It is not true," says Sir George, "that Palestine is the national home of the Jewish people and of no other people." "It is not correct to call its non-Jewish inhabitants 'Arabs,' or to say that they have left no image of their spirit and made no history except in the great Mosque." "Nor can we evade the fact that Christian communities have been as long in possession of their portion of this land as ever the Jews were." "These are legitimate questions," he says, "stirred up by the claims of Zionism, but the Zionists have not yet fully faced them."

To subject the Jews to the possible recurrence of such bitter and sanguinary conflicts which would be inevitable, would be a crime against the triumphs of their whole past history and against the lofty and world-embracing visions of their great prophets and leaders.

4. Though these grave difficulties be met, still we protest against the political segregation of the Jews and the re-establishment in Palestine of a distinctively Jewish State as utterly opposed to the principles of democracy which it is the avowed purpose of the World's Peace Conference to establish.

Whether the Jews be regarded as a "race" or as a "religion," it is contrary to the democratic principles for which the world war was waged to found a nation on either or both of these bases. America, England, France, Italy, Switzerland and all the most advanced nations of the world are composed of representatives of many races and religions. Their glory lies in the freedom of conscience and worship, in the liberty of thought and custom which binds the followers of many faiths and varied civilizations in the common bonds of political union. A Jewish State involves fundamental limitations as to race and religion, else the term "Jewish" means nothing. To unite Church and State, in any form, as under the old Jewish hierarchy, would be a leap backward of two thousand years.

"The rights of other creeds and races will be respected under Jewish dominance," is the assurance of Zionism. But the keynotes of democracy are neither condescension nor tolerance, but justice and equality. All this applies with special force to a country like Palestine. That land is filled with associations sacred to the followers of three great religions, and as a result of migrating movements of many centuries contains an extraordinary number of different ethnic groups, far out of proportion to the small extent of the country itself. Such a condition points clearly to a reorganization of Palestine on the broadest possible basis.

5. We object to the political segregation of the Jews because it is an error to assume that the bond

uniting them is of a national character. They are bound by two factors: First, the bond of common religious beliefs and aspirations and, secondly, the bond of common traditions, customs, and experiences, largely, alas, of common trials and sufferings. Nothing in their present status suggests that they form in any real sense a separate nationalistic unit.

The reorganization of Palestine as far as it affects the Jews is but part of a far larger issue, namely, the constructive endeavor to secure the emancipation of the Jews in all the lands in which they dwell. This movement, inaugurated in the eighteenth century and advancing with steady progress through the western lands, was checked by such reactionary tendencies as caused the expulsion of the Poles from Eastern Prussia and the massacre of Armenians in Turkey. As directed against Jews these tendencies crystallized into a political movement called Anti-Semitism, which had its rise in Germany. Its virulence spread (especially) throughout eastern Europe and led to cruel outbreaks in Roumania and elsewhere, and to the pogroms of Russia with their dire consequences.

To guard against such evils in the future we urge that the great constructive movement, so sadly interrupted, be reinstated and that efficient measures be taken to insure the protection of the law and the full rights of citizenship to Jews in every land. If the basis of the reorganization of governments is henceforth to be democratic, it cannot be contemplated to

exclude any group of people from the enjoyment of full rights.

As to the future of Palestine, it is our fervent hope that what was once a "promised land" for the Jews may become a "land of promise" for all races and creeds, safeguarded by the League of Nations which, it is expected, will be one of the fruits of the Peace Conference to whose deliberations the world now looks forward so anxiously and so full of hope. We ask that Palestine be constituted as a free and independent state, to be governed under a democratic form of government recognizing no distinctions of creed or race or ethnic descent, and with adequate power to protect the country against oppression of any kind. We do not wish to see Palestine, either now or at any time in the future, organized as a Jewish State.


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